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chore(deps): update dependency pyjwt to v2.12.0 [security]#27

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renovate/pypi-pyjwt-vulnerability
Mar 15, 2026
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chore(deps): update dependency pyjwt to v2.12.0 [security]#27
renovate[bot] merged 1 commit intodevelopfrom
renovate/pypi-pyjwt-vulnerability

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@renovate renovate bot commented Mar 14, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
PyJWT 2.9.02.12.0 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-32597

Summary

PyJWT does not validate the crit (Critical) Header Parameter defined in
RFC 7515 §4.1.11. When a JWS token contains a crit array listing
extensions that PyJWT does not understand, the library accepts the token
instead of rejecting it. This violates the MUST requirement in the RFC.

This is the same class of vulnerability as CVE-2025-59420 (Authlib),
which received CVSS 7.5 (HIGH).


RFC Requirement

RFC 7515 §4.1.11:

The "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter indicates that extensions to this
specification and/or [JWA] are being used that MUST be understood and
processed. [...] If any of the listed extension Header Parameters are
not understood and supported by the recipient, then the JWS is invalid.


Proof of Concept

import jwt  # PyJWT 2.8.0
import hmac, hashlib, base64, json

# Construct token with unknown critical extension
header = {"alg": "HS256", "crit": ["x-custom-policy"], "x-custom-policy": "require-mfa"}
payload = {"sub": "attacker", "role": "admin"}

def b64url(data):
    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode()

h = b64url(json.dumps(header, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
p = b64url(json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
sig = b64url(hmac.new(b"secret", f"{h}.{p}".encode(), hashlib.sha256).digest())
token = f"{h}.{p}.{sig}"

# Should REJECT — x-custom-policy is not understood by PyJWT
try:
    result = jwt.decode(token, "secret", algorithms=["HS256"])
    print(f"ACCEPTED: {result}")
    # Output: ACCEPTED: {'sub': 'attacker', 'role': 'admin'}
except Exception as e:
    print(f"REJECTED: {e}")

Expected: jwt.exceptions.InvalidTokenError: Unsupported critical extension: x-custom-policy
Actual: Token accepted, payload returned.

Comparison with RFC-compliant library

# jwcrypto — correctly rejects
from jwcrypto import jwt as jw_jwt, jwk
key = jwk.JWK(kty="oct", k=b64url(b"secret"))
jw_jwt.JWT(jwt=token, key=key, algs=["HS256"])

# raises: InvalidJWSObject('Unknown critical header: "x-custom-policy"')

Impact

  • Split-brain verification in mixed-library deployments (e.g., API
    gateway using jwcrypto rejects, backend using PyJWT accepts)
  • Security policy bypass when crit carries enforcement semantics
    (MFA, token binding, scope restrictions)
  • Token binding bypass — RFC 7800 cnf (Proof-of-Possession) can be
    silently ignored
  • See CVE-2025-59420 for full impact analysis

Suggested Fix

In jwt/api_jwt.py, add validation in _validate_headers() or
decode():

_SUPPORTED_CRIT = {"b64"}  # Add extensions PyJWT actually supports

def _validate_crit(self, headers: dict) -> None:
    crit = headers.get("crit")
    if crit is None:
        return
    if not isinstance(crit, list) or len(crit) == 0:
        raise InvalidTokenError("crit must be a non-empty array")
    for ext in crit:
        if ext not in self._SUPPORTED_CRIT:
            raise InvalidTokenError(f"Unsupported critical extension: {ext}")
        if ext not in headers:
            raise InvalidTokenError(f"Critical extension {ext} not in header")

CWE

  • CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
  • CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

References


Release Notes

jpadilla/pyjwt (PyJWT)

v2.12.0

Compare Source

Fixed


- Annotate PyJWKSet.keys for pyright by @&#8203;tamird in `#&#8203;1134 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1134>`__
- Close ``HTTPError`` response to prevent ``ResourceWarning`` on Python 3.14 by @&#8203;veeceey in `#&#8203;1133 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1133>`__
- Do not keep ``algorithms`` dict in PyJWK instances by @&#8203;akx in `#&#8203;1143 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1143>`__
- Validate the crit (Critical) Header Parameter defined in RFC 7515 §4.1.11. by @&#8203;dmbs335 in `GHSA-752w-5fwx-jx9f <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-752w-5fwx-jx9f>`__
- Use PyJWK algorithm when encoding without explicit algorithm in `#&#8203;1148 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1148>`__

Added
  • Docs: Add PyJWKClient API reference and document the two-tier caching system (JWK Set cache and signing key LRU cache).

v2.11.0

Compare Source

Fixed


Added

v2.10.1

Compare Source

Fixed

- Validate key against allowed types for Algorithm family in `#&#8203;964 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/964>`__
- Add iterator for JWKSet in `#&#8203;1041 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1041>`__
- Validate `iss` claim is a string during encoding and decoding by @&#8203;pachewise in `#&#8203;1040 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1040>`__
- Improve typing/logic for `options` in decode, decode_complete by @&#8203;pachewise in `#&#8203;1045 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1045>`__
- Declare float supported type for lifespan and timeout by @&#8203;nikitagashkov in `#&#8203;1068 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1068>`__

Added
  • Docs: Add example of using leeway with nbf by @​djw8605 in #&#8203;1034 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1034>__
  • Docs: Refactored docs with autodoc; added PyJWS and jwt.algorithms docs by @​pachewise in #&#8203;1045 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1045>__
  • Docs: Documentation improvements for "sub" and "jti" claims by @​cleder in #&#8203;1088 <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/pull/1088>

v2.10.0

Compare Source

Fixed


- Prevent partial matching of `iss` claim by @&#8203;fabianbadoi in `GHSA-75c5-xw7c-p5pm <https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-75c5-xw7c-p5pm>`__

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

NiklasRosenstein added a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2026
## Summary

This PR wires up fully-automatic maintenance for the repo so that open
security PRs merge themselves and a new PyPI release follows
automatically.

### 1. `renovate.json` — automerge for Renovate PRs

- **Security updates** (`matchCategories: ["security"]`): automerged
immediately with highest priority. This will finally close the 4
long-standing security PRs (#21, #24, #25, #27).
- **Minor/patch updates**: automerged after a 3-day stabilisation period
(grouped).
- `platformAutomerge: true` — uses GitHub's native auto-merge so it
respects branch protection rules.
- Adds a `dependencies` label to all Renovate PRs for easy filtering.

### 2. `pyproject.toml` — loosen overly tight dependency pins

The previous constraints had patch-level upper bounds that directly
blocked the open Renovate PRs:

| Dep | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| `cryptography` | `>=44.0.0,<44.0.1` | `>=44.0.0` |
| `urllib3` | `>=2.6.3,<2.6.4` | `>=2.6.3` |

`PyJWT<3.0.0` and `requests<3.0.0` are intentional major-version guards
and are left as-is.

### 3. `.github/workflows/auto-release.yml` — automatic version tagging

After the existing **Python CI** workflow passes on `develop`, this
workflow:

**Path A — unreleased commits exist (e.g. after Renovate PRs merge):**
1. Auto-bumps the patch version in `pyproject.toml` and `__init__.py`
2. Generates a `.changelog/<new_version>.toml` entry summarising the
merged commits
3. Pushes the commit + tag → triggers `release.yml` → publishes to PyPI

**Path B — version was manually bumped in a PR:**
1. Checks that a `.changelog/<version>.toml` entry exists
2. If so, tags the version → triggers `release.yml`

> **Note:** The auto-release commit is pushed with a `RELEASE_TOKEN`
secret (falls back to `GITHUB_TOKEN`). For the tag push to trigger
`release.yml`, a PAT stored as `RELEASE_TOKEN` is needed (pushes via
`GITHUB_TOKEN` do not trigger further workflows). If you don't have one
set up, you can add a fine-grained PAT with `contents: write` scope.

## Test plan

- [ ] Merge this PR
- [ ] Verify Renovate re-evaluates the open security PRs and enables
auto-merge on them
- [ ] Confirm that once a security PR merges and CI passes,
`auto-release.yml` runs and a new patch tag appears
- [ ] Confirm `release.yml` picks up the tag and publishes to PyPI

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-pyjwt-vulnerability branch from 3055e92 to bbb282a Compare March 15, 2026 15:13
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-pyjwt-vulnerability branch from bbb282a to 3c85ce2 Compare March 15, 2026 15:13
@renovate renovate bot merged commit 36816c9 into develop Mar 15, 2026
5 checks passed
@renovate renovate bot deleted the renovate/pypi-pyjwt-vulnerability branch March 15, 2026 15:14
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