IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecofin/v77y2025ics1062940825000233.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information

Author

Listed:
  • Alex, Fabian

Abstract

Using the modeling framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we show that – perhaps surprisingly – there is no influence of average project risk on the capital market equilibrium. The savings interest rate fully determines the amount of credit rationing and the nature of an equilibrium (adverse selection, two-prices etc.). This rate is, in turn, fully determined by the relative probabilities of success of firms’ projects (and, thus, repayment of their debt). Hence, making capital markets overall “less risky”, which may for example be the case when financial markets become greener, does not alleviate concerns of asymmetric information. The result holds both for cases of hidden information and for those of hidden actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex, Fabian, 2025. "Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:77:y:2025:i:c:s1062940825000233
    DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2025.102383
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062940825000233
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.najef.2025.102383?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    --->

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. de Meza, David & Webb, David, 1999. "Wealth, Enterprise and Credit Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 153-163, April.
    2. repec:exe:wpaper:97/15 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Heinkel, Robert & Kraus, Alan & Zechner, Josef, 2001. "The Effect of Green Investment on Corporate Behavior," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 431-449, December.
    4. Lutz G. Arnold, 2012. "A Game‐Theoretic Foundation for Competitive Equilibria in the Stiglitz–Weiss Model," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 13(2), pages 211-227, May.
    5. Bolton, Patrick & Kacperczyk, Marcin, 2021. "Do investors care about carbon risk?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 517-549.
    6. repec:fth:exetec:97/15 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Yujun Cui & Sean Geobey & Olaf Weber & Haiying Lin, 2018. "The Impact of Green Lending on Credit Risk in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(6), pages 1-16, June.
    8. Lutz G. Arnold & Johannes Reeder & Stefanie Trepl, 2014. "Single-name Credit Risk, Portfolio Risk and Credit Rationing," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(322), pages 311-328, April.
    9. Juhyun Jung & Kathleen Herbohn & Peter Clarkson, 2018. "Carbon Risk, Carbon Risk Awareness and the Cost of Debt Financing," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 150(4), pages 1151-1171, July.
    10. Malcolm Baker & Daniel Bergstresser & George Serafeim & Jeffrey Wurgler, 2022. "The Pricing and Ownership of US Green Bonds," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 415-437, November.
    11. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 912-927, December.
    12. Harry Markowitz, 1952. "Portfolio Selection," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 7(1), pages 77-91, March.
    13. Xunhua Su & Li Zhang, 2017. "A Reexamination of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz and Weiss Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(5), pages 1059-1072, August.
    14. Krahnen Jan & Rocholl Jörg & Thum Marcel, 2023. "A Primer on Green Finance: From Wishful Thinking to Marginal Impact," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 74(1), pages 1-19, April.
    15. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1992. "Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets and Its Implications for Macro-economics," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(4), pages 694-724, October.
    16. Coco, Giuseppe, 1999. "Collateral, heterogeneity in risk attitude and the credit market equilibrium," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 559-574, March.
    17. Lutz G. Arnold & John G. Riley, 2009. "On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2012-2021, December.
    18. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
    19. Coco, G., 1997. "Credit Rationing and the Welfare Gain from Usury Laws," Discussion Papers 9715, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    20. Xudong An & Gary Pivo, 2020. "Green Buildings in Commercial Mortgage‐Backed Securities: The Effects of LEED and Energy Star Certification on Default Risk and Loan Terms," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 48(1), pages 7-42, March.
    21. Arnold Lutz G., 2012. "A Game-Theoretic Foundation for Competitive Equilibria in the Stiglitz–Weiss Model," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 211-227, May.
    22. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    23. Wette, Hildegard C, 1983. "Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 442-445, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Giuseppe Coco & Giuseppe Pignataro, 2010. "Inequality of Opportunity in the Credit Market," SERIES 0026, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Jan 2010.
    2. Giuseppe Coco & Giuseppe Pignataro, 2013. "Unfair credit allocations," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 241-251, June.
    3. repec:bla:scotjp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:162-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka, 2018. "Collateral in credit rationing in markets with asymmetric information," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 97-102.
    5. Coco, G. & Pignataro, G., 2011. "Perverse cross-subsidization in the credit market," Working Papers 11/01, Department of Economics, City University London.
    6. G. Coco & G. Pignataro, 2012. "Wealth inequality, unequal opportunities and inefficient credit market," Working Papers wp851, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    7. Coco, Giuseppe, 1999. "Collateral, heterogeneity in risk attitude and the credit market equilibrium," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 559-574, March.
    8. Fabian Alex, 2024. "Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information," Working Papers 235, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    9. Sandar Win, 2018. "What are the possible future research directions for bank’s credit risk assessment research? A systematic review of literature," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 743-759, October.
    10. Aivazian, Varouj & Gu, Xinhua & Qiu, Jiaping & Huang, Bihong, 2015. "Loan collateral, corporate investment, and business cycle," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 380-392.
    11. Lutz G. Arnold & Johannes Reeder & Stefanie Trepl, 2014. "Single-name Credit Risk, Portfolio Risk and Credit Rationing," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(322), pages 311-328, April.
    12. Bieta, Volker & Broll, Udo & Siebe, Wilfried, 2014. "Collateral in banking policy: On the possibility of signaling," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 137-141.
    13. Kjenstad, Einar C. & Su, Xunhua & Zhang, Li, 2015. "Credit rationing by loan size: A synthesized model," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 20-27.
    14. Coco, Giuseppe & Pignataro, Giuseppe, 2014. "The poor are twice cursed: Wealth inequality and inefficient credit market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 149-159.
    15. Neyer, Ulrike, 2004. "Asymmetric information in credit markets--implications for the transition in Eastern Germany," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 61-78, March.
    16. Michel Poitevin, 1989. "Information et marchés financiers : une revue de littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 65(4), pages 555-589.
    17. Francesco Cohen & Alessandro Fedele & Paolo M. Panteghini, 2016. "Corporate taxation and financial strategies under asymmetric information," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 33(1), pages 9-34, April.
    18. Kubin, Ingrid & Zörner, Thomas O., 2021. "Credit cycles, human capital and the distribution of income," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 954-975.
    19. Andy Cosh & Douglas Cumming & Alan Hughes, 2009. "Outside Enterpreneurial Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1494-1533, October.
    20. Mark Gertler, 1988. "Financial structure and aggregate economic activity: an overview," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 559-596.
    21. Roberto Tamborini, 2010. "The Macroeconomics of Imperfect Capital Markets: Whither Saving-Investment Imbalances?," Contributions to Economics, in: Giorgio Calcagnini & Enrico Saltari (ed.), The Economics of Imperfect Markets, chapter 0, pages 137-166, Springer.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; Financial markets; Green loans; Hidden information; Hidden action; Project risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:77:y:2025:i:c:s1062940825000233. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620163 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.