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Chapter 1: The Foundations of Marx’s Materialist Epistemology

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A Materialist Theory of Justice

Abstract

This chapter is an introduction to materialism as a research strategy as originated by Marx. It presents his twin methodological and epistemological approaches to studying social pathologies largely from an anthropological and historical standpoint, thus filling a gap in the existing literature on the subject. Each of his approaches makes a truth claim. The truth claim of his methodology is that true social science can only be attained by studying human evolution in its material environment from an empirical point of view, i.e., from bare subsistence to the more sophisticated forms of human flourishing. It banishes all non-rational modes of thought such as myths, superstition, and religion from such inquiry. The truth claim of his epistemology is in positing the mind, matter, the senses, and experience as combining to provide meaningful knowledge of the material world and the place of humans and their evolution in nature.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Paul Redding, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/hegel/.

  2. 2.

    Karl Marx, “The Difference Between Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature,” in “Doctoral Dissertation,” in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975) 1:30, https://archive.org/details/karlmarxfrederic0001marx (hereafter cited as Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation”).

  3. 3.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 30.

  4. 4.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 30, note c. (Marx quoting a letter from Epicurus to Menoeceus). See also Diogenes Laeritus, Diogenis Laertii De clarorum philosophorum vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus libre decem (X,123).

  5. 5.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 30, note d. (Marx quoting Prometheus in Prometheus Bound by Aeschylus). In Greek mythology, Prometheus is a Titan who stole fire from the gods, defying Zeus, for the benefit of humankind. Marx counterposes this dictum of Prometheus “against all heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest divinity.”

  6. 6.

    Panagiotis Kondylis, “Marx and Ancient Greece” (February 3, 2018, presentation before The Society for Studies of Modern Greek Culture Moraitis School) trans. C. F., 12. See also John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000):40–45 (explaining the influence of Epicurus on seventeenth and eighteenth century European scientific thought), 49 (citing Immanuel Kant who in his Critique of Pure Reason described Epicurus as the “foremost philosopher of sensibility” in so far as his sensual system “never exceeded the bounds of experience”), 211–12 (explaining how the “immanent dialectics” of Epicurean atomism was superior to eighteenth century science “because of its intuitive understanding of the material world as evolving out of chaos, as developing, coming into being”) (hereafter cited as Foster, Marx’s Ecology).

  7. 7.

    Sylvia Berryman, “Ancient Atomism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), eds. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/atomism-ancient. See also Elizabeth Asmis, “A Tribute to a Hero: Marx’s Interpretation of Epicurus in his Dissertation,” in Approaches to Lucretius: Traditions and Innovations in Reading De Rerum Natura, ed. Donncha O’Rourke, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 247–248 (discussing the importance of not disturbing ataraxia) (hereafter cited as Asmis, “A Tribute to a Hero”).

  8. 8.

    “Ataraxy,” Word Genius, accessed January 30, 2024, https://www.wordgenius.com/words/ataraxy.

  9. 9.

    Foster, Marx’s Ecology, 53–54. See also Christoph Schuringa, “Thought and Reality in Marx’s Early Writings on Ancient Philosophy,” European Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 4 (February 2022): 1526.

  10. 10.

    Hegel’s “idealist” conception of history viewed it as a progression through a logically necessitated teleological movement. In his History of Philosophy, Hegel views philosophy as the evolving search for knowledge of reality in which each new phase supersedes and incorporates the previous one. In the first phase the object of philosophy is Being, i.e., the objective world; in the second phase the object is Thought, i.e., the process of reason; and in the third is the division of thought into the abstract universal with reason as an immanent principle, and the other opposing it is the principle of the abstract individual, with reason as abstract individual self-consciousness. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, 2: 235–37 (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). See G. Teeple “The Doctoral Dissertation of Karl Marx,” History of Political Thought 11, no.1 (Spring 1990): 91 (hereafter cited as Teeple, “The Doctoral Dissertation of Karl Marx”). The Hegelian conception was later taken over by Marx, who retained the idea of progression but modified it by “inverting” the Hegelian dialectic to advance a “materialist” theory of history.

  11. 11.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 73.

  12. 12.

    Asmis, “A Tribute to a Hero,” 248.

  13. 13.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 49.

  14. 14.

    For the logic of this argument, see G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. William Wallace (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 142–45. For a brief critique on the dangers of applying contemporary philosophical categories of thought on ancient philosophy, see Cyril Bailey, “Karl Marx on Greek Atomism,” The Classical Quarterly 22, no. 3/4 (Jul.–Oct. 1928): 206. Bailey argues that there is “no evidence” in ancient thought for such interpretations and that they are possible only with a good deal of “reading between the lines.”

  15. 15.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 50–51. Italics in original. See also Teeple, “The Doctoral Dissertation of Karl Marx,” 96.

  16. 16.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 73. (Marx quoting Lucretius, On the Nature of Things).

  17. 17.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 49, notes 10, 11, and 12. Lucretius expressly links the swerve with libera voluntas (free will), see Titus Lucretius Carus, Lucretius on The Nature Of Things: A Philosophical Poem in Six Books, trans. Rev. John Selby Watson (London: George Bell & Sons, 1880), 63–64, https://archive.org/details/onnatureofthings00lucruoft (hereafter cited as Lucretius, On the Nature of Things). See also Jean Salem, “Marx et L’Atomism Ancien. La Dissertation de 1841,” Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia 25 no. 4, (1995): 1588 (hereafter cited as Salem, “Marx et L’Atomism Ancien.”).

  18. 18.

    Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 63–64.

  19. 19.

    Asmis gives the following summation: “Marx’s full explanation, then, for Epicurus’ demolition of the traditional gods rests on the construction of a system that places self-consciousness at the very core of his natural philosophy. By introducing the swerve into atomism, Epicurus introduced a principle of self-consciousness that emerges in the end as an awareness that the goal of life, serenity, demands the dissolution of the traditional gods into powerless, transitory beings. By fulfilling this demand, human self-consciousness asserts its freedom from the power of the gods. Marx thus raises human self-consciousness, or freedom, to the place formally occupied by god.” Asmis, “A Tribute to a Hero,” 257.

  20. 20.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 66–72.

  21. 21.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 38–45.

  22. 22.

    Salem, “Marx et L’Atomism Ancien.,” 1588. Salem uses the term “désespoir épistémologique”; “désespoir” literally means “hopelessness.” I have used “blind alley” as a substitute.

  23. 23.

    Asmis, “A Tribute to a Hero,” 245.

  24. 24.

    Foster, Marx’s Ecology, 53. For a review of Foster’s book, see Jason W. Moore, “(Re)Discovering Marx’s Materialism,” Organization & Environment 14, no.2 (June 2001): 241.

  25. 25.

    John Stanley, “The Marxism of Marx’s Doctoral Dissertation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 33, no.1 (Jan. 1995): 134.

  26. 26.

    Foster, Marx’s Ecology, 55.

  27. 27.

    “Deep time,” now also called “geologic time,” refers to a time scale that accounts for Earth’s long developmental history, in contrast to the Christian creationist account of time. Epicurus believed humans descended from the earth, not the sky, leading him to argue that material existence only became evident through evolution, and evolution only became evident through time. Foster, Marx’s Ecology, 46.

  28. 28.

    Human sensuousness is therefore embodied time, the existing reflection of the sensuous world in itself.” Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 64. Italics in original. Referring to a letter from Epicurus to Herodotus, Marx notes that the collision of atoms (“accidentals of bodies”) is perceived by the senses and that this sensuous perception is in fact “the source of time and time itself … [h]ence the senses are the only criteria in concrete nature, just as abstract reason is the only criterion in the world of the atoms.” Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 65.

  29. 29.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 46. Italics in original.

  30. 30.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 51–52. Italics in original.

  31. 31.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 52. Italics in original. The term “kinetic materialism” is borrowed, see Boris Hennig, “What Sort of Kinetic Materialism did Marx Find in Epicurus?,” review of Marx in Motion: A New Materialist Marxism, by Thomas Nail, Monthly Review 72, no. 11, (April 2021), https://monthlyreview.org/2021/04/01/what-sort-of-kinetic-materialism-did-marx-find-in-epicurus/ (hereafter cited as Hennig, “Kinetic Materialism”). In the book that is the subject of the review, Nail describes Marx’s dialectic triad as involving straight motion that gets declined so that it curves and ultimately “folds back onto itself,” with the resulting circular motion being described as repulsion. This process accounts for the objective world, including sensation and human consciousness, indeed, life in general. Thomas Nail, Marx in Motion: A New Materialist Marxism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 21–22, 33, 63, 83, 114, 137.

  32. 32.

    Hennig, “Kinetic Materialism.”

  33. 33.

    “For man to become man he must objectify himself, he must have as the object of his consciousness his own universal self, that which he has in common with all. To be his own object he must have ended his sense of dependence on, or determination by, nature. Like the atom, which becomes itself as ‘abstract individuality’ only through the declination which negates its determination by the straight line, so too the human becomes human, i.e., conscious of himself as his own object, as a consequence of rupturing his direct relation to nature, his determination by nature. The first stage in self-consciousness takes the form of abstract individuality.” Teeple, “The Doctoral Dissertation of Karl Marx,” 96.

  34. 34.

    Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978) 145, VI (hereafter cited as Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach”).

  35. 35.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 53.

  36. 36.

    Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 63–64. “Liberty of action” is “wrested from the fates” by means of the deviation. See also, the translator’s note, “To declension from the right line only, therefore, can liberty of action be attributable.” Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 63.

  37. 37.

    Jean Hyppolite, “The Concept of Life and Consciousness in Hegel’s Jena Philosophy,” in Studies on Marx and Hegel; ed. and trans. John O’Neill, (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 3. See also, Teeple, “The Doctoral Dissertation of Karl Marx,” 96.

  38. 38.

    Teeple, “The Doctoral Dissertation of Karl Marx,” 98.

  39. 39.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 49. (Marx quoting Lucretius).

  40. 40.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 66.

  41. 41.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 67.

  42. 42.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 68.

  43. 43.

    Peter Fenves, “Marx’s Doctoral Thesis on Two Greek Atomists and The Post-Kantian Interpretations,” Journal of the History of Ideas 47, no. 4 (Sep. 1986): 445–46.

  44. 44.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 70.

  45. 45.

    Asmis, “A Tribute to a Hero,” 255.

  46. 46.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 70. Italics in original.

  47. 47.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 70. Italics in original.

  48. 48.

    See text at notes 20–21 above.

  49. 49.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 71. Italics in original. See Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 48, 51 (Marx on the tension between the abstract and the concrete). See also John L. Stanley, “Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature,” Science & Society 61, no.4 (Winter, 1997/1998): 458 (explaining Marx’s criticism of Epicurus) (hereafter cited as Stanley, “Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature”).

  50. 50.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 72–73. For Marx, knowledge of meteors was the culmination of Epicurean “atomistics” not only as a manifestation of human freedom but also as “the natural science of self-consciousness.”

  51. 51.

    Teeple, “The Doctoral Dissertation of Karl Marx,” 111.

  52. 52.

    Cyril Bailey, “The Mind of Lucretius,” The American Journal of Philology 61, no.3 (1940): 291. Cyril Bailey notes that Lucretius’ thought anticipated modern atomic science. Bailey does not however discuss or assert any possible connection between atomic and human behavior, nor does he suggest that Lucretius took a position on this subject.

  53. 53.

    For further investigations into this topic, see Ben Gliniecki, “Quantum Physics, Dialectics and Society: From Marx and Engels to Khrennikov and Haven,” In Defense of Marxism, December 4, 2013, https://www.marxist.com/quantum-society.htm. This is a book review of Quantum Social Science by A. Khrennikov and E. Haven. The review discusses how the authors apply ideas of interconnectedness in quantum physics to society as a whole, in a way reminiscent of Marx’s strong thesis. For example, “… the interference term [used to explain probability values in wave-particle experiments] when applied to economics, also explains the seemingly illogical probability values for economic decision-making … [and] … the same mathematical tools that are required to explain the contradictory processes taking place at a sub-atomic level are also required to explain the contradictory processes in society. In other words, the dialectical understanding of quantum particles also applies to economics … They also explain how quantum thinking can give us a deeper understanding of a plethora of scientific and social institutions, from neuroscience to voting patterns.” See also, K. K. Theckedath, “Marxism and Quantum Mechanics,” Social Scientist 3, no. 1 (August 1974): 34, T. Jayaraman, “Marxism and Quantum Mechanics,” Social Scientist 3, no. 11 (June 1975): 65–72 and Alexei Kojevnikov, “Probability, Marxism, and Quantum Ensembles,” available at https://history.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2019/06/probability2012.pdf.

  54. 54.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” “The Subject of the Treatise,” 34. See also Charles Barbour, “‘Last of the Schoolmen’: The Young Marx, Latin Culture, and the Doctoral Dissertation,” The European Legacy 28, no.1 (June 2022): 44–64, and Foster, Marx’s Ecology, 40–45 (explaining the influence of Epicurus on seventeenth and eighteenth century European scientific thought). One may speculate that the “dull ending” that Marx attributed to Greek philosophy was because it did not realize its full potential at the time.

  55. 55.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 44. Italics in original.

  56. 56.

    Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. Manfred H. Vogel (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merril Company, 1966), 38.

  57. 57.

    “My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it … With me … the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought … With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted …,” Karl Marx, “Postface to the Second Edition,” in Capital: A Crtique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes (Penguin Classics, 1992) 1: 102–3 (hereafter cited as Marx, Capital). For the contrasting view that Marx nevertheless still gave priority to the concept of nature rather than nature itself and thus ended up in “substantially the same position” as Hegel, see Stanley, “Marx’s Critique Of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature,” 451–3, restating the viewpoint of Alfred Schmidt, in his book The Concept of Nature in Marx (1971). The incorrectness of this view is confirmed by Stanley who also argues that Schmidt’s reasoning is faulty.

  58. 58.

    Friedrich Engels, “Feuerbach and End of Classical German Philosophy,” in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, (New York: International Publishers, 1991), 26: 383, https://archive.org/details/karlmarxfrederic0026karl/page/382/mode/2up.

  59. 59.

    “Self-consciousness is rather a quality of human nature, of the human eye, etc.; it is not human nature that is a quality of self-consciousness.” Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844,” in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 3: 334 (hereafter cited as Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts”).

  60. 60.

    Marx, “Doctoral Dissertation,” 63, 64, 65, 70, 96 note 3.

  61. 61.

    Stanley, “Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy,” 453.

  62. 62.

    Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” 303–304, 336.

  63. 63.

    Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” 336–37.

  64. 64.

    Karl Marx, “England and Materialist Philosophy,” in The Holy Family (Pattern Books, Sept. 2020) 512, https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Holy_Family/NswyEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1 (hereafter cited as Marx, “England and Materialist Philosophy”). The quotation represents Marx’s summary restatement of key ideas regarding the acquisition of knowledge in Essai Sur L’origine Des Connaissances Humaines by Étienne Bonnot de Condillac.

  65. 65.

    Marx, “England and Materialist Philosophy,” 514. In a similar vein, on the question of mastering the natural environment of the external world, Marx declares that it is a question of “replacing the domination of circumstances and chance over individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances,” Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “The German Ideology,” in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1976) 5: 438 (hereafter cited as Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology”).

  66. 66.

    Karl Marx, “Feuerbach: Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlooks,” in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1976) 5: 27–31.

  67. 67.

    William H. Shaw, “Marx and Morgan,” History and Theory 23, no. 2 (May 1984): 222 (stating that “For Marx and Engels what really mattered was not Morgan’s political judgments, but rather his theoretical approach to primitive times and the assistance Ancient Society gave to their theory in treating pre-history”), (hereafter cited as Shaw, “Marx and Morgan”).

  68. 68.

    See Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company 1909) 44, 535, 539, 553 and Lewis H. Morgan, Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family (Washington City, The Smithsonian Institution 1871) 14, 492, for references to the importance of property in society.

  69. 69.

    Shaw, “Marx and Morgan,” 216. For Marx’s notes on Morgan’s Ancient Society see The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx, ed. Lawrence Krader (Assen, The Netherlands, Van Gorcum & Company 1974).

  70. 70.

    Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 41.

  71. 71.

    Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 43.

  72. 72.

    Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 44.

  73. 73.

    Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 44.

  74. 74.

    Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 44. (Marginal note by Marx).

  75. 75.

    “[T]he productive forces, the state of society and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labor implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity, that enjoyment and labour, production and consumption, devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour.” Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 45.

  76. 76.

    Marx, Capital, 102–3.

  77. 77.

    Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, trans. T. B. Bottomore, eds. T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel (New York, McGraw Hill 1964), 51.

  78. 78.

    Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” 143–45, I, V, VIII and XI. The very large question of “change” and of “humanizing” the world is postponed until later chapters.

  79. 79.

    Eric J. Hobsbawm, introduction to Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, by Karl Marx, trans. Jack Cohen, ed. Eric J. Hobsbawm (New York, International Publishers 1965), 12.

  80. 80.

    “The various stages of development in the division of labour are just so many different forms of property, i.e., the existing stage in the division of labour determines also the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material, instrument, and product of labor.” Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 32.

  81. 81.

    For further discussion see Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, trans. Jack Cohen, ed. Eric J. Hobsbawm (New York, International Publishers 1965), 82–83, 122, 123, 125, 130. See also Isaak Dore, Homo Juridicus: Culture as a Normative Order (Durham, Carolina Academic Press 2016), 241 et seq., (hereafter cited as Dore, Homo Juridicus).

  82. 82.

    For this section I draw on Dore, Homo Juridicus, 251 et seq. Engels explicitly adopted Morgan’s evolutionary phases in his The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, and some published versions even subtitle this work “In the Light of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan.” Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State: in the Light of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan (London, Lawrence and Wishart 1941).

  83. 83.

    Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York, Pathfinder Press 1972) 25 (hereafter cited as Engels, The Origin of the Family).

  84. 84.

    Engels, The Origin of the Family, 25.

  85. 85.

    Engels, The Origin of the Family, 25–26.

  86. 86.

    Engels, The Origin of the Family, 26.

  87. 87.

    “[W]ithin this structure of society based on ties of sex, the productivity of labour develops more and more; with it, private property and exchange, differences in wealth, the possibility of utilizing the labour power of others, and thereby the basis of class antagonisms: … The old society based on sex groups bursts asunder in the collision of the newly-developed social classes; in its place a new society appears, constituted in a state, the lower unit of which are no longer groups based on ties of sex but territorial groups, a society in which the family system is entirely dominated by the property system, and in which the class antagonisms and class struggles, which make up the content of all hitherto written history, now freely develop.” Engels, The Origin of the Family, 26.

  88. 88.

    Engels, The Origin of the Family, 28–29.

  89. 89.

    Engels, The Origin of the Family, 151–152.

  90. 90.

    Engels, The Origin of the Family, 64–68.

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Dore, I. (2024). Chapter 1: The Foundations of Marx’s Materialist Epistemology. In: A Materialist Theory of Justice. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74338-2_1

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