Design of Supply Chain Intellectual Property Securitization Service Agreement Based on Moral Hazard

Abstract

Supply chain intellectual property securitization is an effective attempt to solve the financing problems of supply chain SMEs. However, supply chain intellectual property securitization also faces great risks. Based on the risk of the underlying asset pool and the design of the transaction structure, this paper studies the Asset Management Service Agreement signed by the manager and the original stakeholder under the background of the moral hazard of the original stakeholder. It is found that in the case of moral hazard of original stakeholders, the incentive mechanism is more effective than punishment for risk control of underlying assets. In the face of different risk aversion of managers, the incentive and punishment costs to ensure the success of intellectual property securitization can be calculated and the optimal service agreement can be designed. The research of this paper is helpful to the risk management of supply chain intellectual property securitization and promote the development of supply chain intellectual property securitization.