Chapter 1. Introduction: Reflections on an Agenda for Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: International Development Research Centre

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WORK ON THIS VOLUME began with the Dakar Conference on Regional Integration in West Africa, of January 1993, whose proceedings are summarized by Diop and Lavergne (1994). Of the 40 papers presented at that conference, 11 are included here in revised form. Four new papers have been added,¹ in addition to this introductory chapter, to fill gaps and provide a rounded picture of what regional integration is and could be in West Africa. Some gaps inevitably remain, and attention will be drawn to them in this chapter by referring the reader to work available elsewhere or in progress in specific fields such as agriculture, health, education, communications, and regional security.

We begin this chapter by reviewing the major ï¿½strategic visionsï¿½ or perspectives represented in the first part of the volume. The rest of the chapter provides an overview of specific issues and options. We look at two broad areas: issues having to do predominantly with economic integration, including trade policy, monetary integration and sectoral policy issues; and those having to do with the role of the public sector, including the provision of regional infrastructure, regional cooperation in the provision of public services, and selected issues of a governmental character (protection of human rights, regional security and natural resource management). We then address the sovereignty issue, looking at alternative approaches for achieving regional objectives through shared sovereignty, regional cooperation, or unilateral action, before offering some suggestions for future research and some concluding comments.

Some conceptual clarification may be useful before going on to better appreciate the differences between four major concepts: those of regionalism, regional integration, regional cooperation and economic integration. The concept of ï¿½regionalismï¿½ does not require much elaboration. We take it to represent a regional approach to problem solving including regional integration, regional cooperation or both. The terms ï¿½regional integrationï¿½ and ï¿½regional cooperationï¿½ have in common the involvement of neighbouring countries in collaborative ventures. However, regional cooperation implies that this is organized on an ad hoc and temporary basis through contractual arrangements of some sort, around projects of mutual interest, while regional integration involves something more permanent (Bourenane*).²

¹ Bourenane, Mytelka, Stryker et at., and Lavergne and Daddieh (chapters 3, 6, 7 and 10).

Most of the discussion in this volume bears on regional integration, characterized by the establishment of joint institutional mechanisms, and a degree of shared sovereignty. As many of the authors in this volume point out, existing regional integration schemes in Africa function in an ï¿½intergovernmentalï¿½ rather than ï¿½supranationalï¿½ mode, and the actual sharing of sovereignty is minimal (Ntumba*). However, member states do accept certain obligations, such as the payment of dues, the reduction of trade barriers, the reduction of barriers to the free movement of people, etc.

The concept of regional integration takes on a predominantly economic slant in the literature, to the point of confusion with that of ï¿½economicï¿½ integration. However, it should not be viewed exclusively in such terms. Regional integration can cover the full range of public-sector activity, including not only the coordination of economic policies, but also regional security, human rights, education, health, research and technology, and natural resource management. The concept of regional integration is thus a broader one than that of economic integration. The expression ï¿½economic integrationï¿½ can be used in different ways. As Bourenane* points out, it can be used generically in reference to growing economic ties among countries which mayor may not be geographically contiguous ï¿½ linkages between Africa and Europe, for example. However, the authors in this volume usually use the term more restrictively to refer to increased trade and factor flows between neighboring countries, as a result of trade liberalization or the coordination of economic policies.

VISIONS AND PRIORITIES

The revival of interest in regional integration and cooperation is a worldwide phenomenon, inspired by the success of the European experience. It also reflects a growing appreciation of the benefits to be derived from regional unityï¿½ and cooperation in meeting the challenges posed by increasingly competitive world markets (Mytelka*). One often speaks of the ï¿½new regionalismï¿½ (De Melo and Panagariya 1992; CEC 1992). In Africa, regional unity is seen as a possible solution to the continentï¿½s deep and prolonged economic and social crisis, at a time when private energies are being released thanks to the strengthening of civil society and the deregulation and privatization of national economies, while the continuing decline of state-imposed barriers to intercountry flows is paving the way for increased regional trade (World Bank 1994, pp. 62ï¿½76, 230-231).

Regional aspirations as shared by West African statesmen, intellectuals, and citizens alike reflect a general desire to break the confines of the nation-state, and a denial of all that divides the region, including the multiple barriers to the free movement of goods and services, people, and capital among countries, and differences in legal, governmental, and educational structures. West Africans are aware that the kingdoms and cultures of West Africa were relatively well integrated in precolonial times, as accounts of the region amply attest (Oliver and Atmore 1981a,b), and the quest for regional unity is in many respects a search for oneï¿½s roots (Adotevi*). These regional aspirations also constitute a response to the manifest incapacity of the state to generate development. They thus include a search for solutions extending beyond what existing nation-states appear capable of providing, including better regional infrastructure, better management of the regionï¿½s resources (Olomola 1993; Debailleul et al.*), and even a broader range of freedoms (Quashigah*; Adewoye*).

This search for new solutions also has its centripetal side, not only in Africa, but worldwide, in the growing demands of communities and private citizens for greater control over their own affairs. The manifestation of this is clear in calls for greater decentralization of government and public services, greater community participation in decision-making, and withdrawal of the state from certain types of intervention in the economy. The state in West Africa is thus being assailed from both directions: it is called upon to share power with lower levels of government and other social entities and with regional bodies. These pressures are not contradictory, and do not amount to a negation of the state, but clearly the day has passed when the nation-state is expected to be all things to all people, from policeman to ultimate provider. The objective is for each level of government to provide such services and functions as it can supply most efficiently and effectively, and it is for the better application of such a principle that the peoples of West Africa seem to be striving.

Because of its holistic and multidimensional coverage of the issues, the Dakar conference provided a useful gauge of evolving views on regional integration and cooperation, while confirming the attachment of African intellectuals to the regional ideal (Diop and Lavergne 1994).^3ï¿½ However conference participants noted the failures of past efforts, and some of the key papers analyzing the reasons for such failures are represented in this volume (Bundu*; Bach*; and Ntumba*). Bourenane* and Lavergne and Daddieh* help to complete the picture by reviewing the theoretical literature and the often critical points of view of donors on this subject.

³ The interest of African intellectuals in regional integration was indicated by the large number of abstracts and papers received in response to the call for papers for the conference: over 300 submissions of abstracts and over 100 papers, from all parts of the subregion.

Former executive secretary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Abass Bundu, * presents a vision of all that ECOWAS could be, and calls for renewed leadership and commitment from the member states. He assesses the impediments to regional integration in West Africa, but points to some of the factors increasing the odds of success in the present conjuncture, in particular the more liberal economic policies recently being adopted in most countries, the advance of democracy in the region, and the approval of the revised ECOWAS Treaty by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in 1993.

However, as some of the other authors in this volume point out (Bourenane*; Adotevi*; and Bach*), one cannot simply wish regional integration into existence, as the current institutional approach would have it. Bourenane* provides a survey of the theoretical models and approaches to regional integration that have been proposed. He and Bach* critically describe the current view as ï¿½voluntaristic,ï¿½ ï¿½institutionalist,ï¿½ ï¿½state-led,ï¿½ and ï¿½functionalistï¿½. More simply put, the approach is one whereby heads of state assemble on a regular basis and pronounce ambitious declarations of what they are going to do, as a prelude to actually doing very little.

According to Adotevi,* regional integration cannot properly succeed in the absence of a sense of belonging and identity of the general population with the proposed community of countries. He reminds us of the complex cultural identities inherited from the precolonial era, with its fluid and shifting borders, and suggests the need to draw upon those cultural identities if modern states and regional schemes are to acquire the legitimacy they currently lack. This suggests a model of regional integration based on a fairly radical restructuring of political authority of some sort. It also signifies the need to adopt a multilayered approach to community-building in which no particular community, such as the state, can lay claim to exclusive loyalty. Bourenane* develops the same point. In his view, regional integration must be built up brick by brick, and what is required is a dynamic strategy for moving forward along realistic lines, on the basis of achievable targets. Such an approach would involve a shift in emphasis, toward community-building, as against institution building or the pronouncement of empty treaty declarations.

Bach,* who is critical of the Abuja Treaty and holds out little hope for the success of ECOWAS, is nonetheless extremely concerned about the need to reconcile economic policies between the francophone union and its anglophone neighbours, Nigeria in particular. He considers the discrepancies in the exchange rate and trade policies of those two groups of countries to be fundamentally disruptive. Misalignments of real exchange rates such as we have seen between the franc zone and Nigeria, the franc zone and Ghana, and other pairs of countries, generate enormous rent-seeking opportunities through smuggling, thus crowding out legitimate trade as an entrepreneurial activity, while contributing to the gradual collapse of the state in the region.

The result is not regional integration, but disintegration all around. The 50% devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994 will help to redress the situation, but the region would have been better served had Nigeria not complicated things by officially revaluing the naira, by an equally substantial proportion, at virtually the same time. The reconciliation of macroeconomic and trade policies between the franc zone and its anglophone neighbours is no doubt the priority issue for regional integration in West Africa.

Many of the ideas and criticisms expressed by other authors are to be found also in the review of donor viewpoints provided by Lavergne and Daddieh*. Drawing lessons from the failure of past schemes, the donor community advocates a pragmatic and flexible approach constructed around the concept of ï¿½variable geometryï¿½ which allows for the choice of countries participating in different schemes to change over time or from one project to another. They also share a liberal view of economic policy, considering that economic integration will most rapidly be achieved through the structural adjustment process. Worth noting is the current support of several donors for the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). This support is viewed with mixed or sometimes hostile feelings by advocates of ECOWAS, who feel that the UEMOA project is the perfect example of how the ï¿½pragmaticï¿½ and ï¿½flexibleï¿½ approach of the donors can be used to undermine the more ambitious plans of the Abuja Treaty, with its emphasis on ECOWAS as the preferred instrument for regional integration in West Africa. Although advocates of the UEMOA project deny the antithetic relationship of the two schemes, the marriage is certainly not an obvious one, and substantial effort will be required to ensure the complementarity as against the opposition of these two schemes.

Mytelkaï¿½s paper, which constitutes the last chapter in the ï¿½Strategic Visions and Prospectsï¿½ part of the volume, provides a fresh viewpoint on regional integration. She notes the changing character of regional integration efforts in recent years, away from the protectionist bent of the past, in favour of a new approach involving integration in world markets based on strength through regional unity. Mytelka* considers regional cooperation and coordination in the field of technology to be essential if Africa is to compete and survive in the international markets of the 21st century. Stressing cooperation in the application of knowledge to all sectors, she proposes an approach to regional integration described as ï¿½innovation-driven,ï¿½ as opposed to earlier ï¿½exchange-drivenï¿½ or ï¿½production-specializationï¿½ models.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

REGIONAL TRADE

Not long ago, regional integration was identified essentially with economic matters ï¿½ regional trade in particular. Most people still think predominantly in those terms. Yet, there is widespread consensus that preference schemes to stimulate regional trade have not worked as intended in the region and probably cannot be made to work without some major rethinking about the costs and difficulties of implementing such schemes (Robson 1987; Foroutan 1993). There are two aspects to this argument. One has to do with the wisdom of import-substituting industrialization as a development strategy. This is an age-old debate, to which justice cannot be done in this short chapter. However, the empirical evidence does support some version of neoliberal thinking in this regard. The prevailing consensus among development economists does not oppose protectionism in all forms and circumstances. However, it does oppose excessively high levels of protection accompanied by overvalued exchange rates, which end up penalizing exports and stifling economic growth (Badiane*). It also requires that protection be accompanied by certain performance criteria, as in Southeast Asia (World Bank 1993). Finally, it requires a degree of strategic thinking that has not been present in West Africa, where a rentier mentality of ï¿½protectionism at all costsï¿½ has been the rule. Protectionism of this sort long ago exhausted its potential in West Africa, and there should be no question about the need for alternative strategies at this time.

The second part of the argument concerns the fiscal implications of preference schemes and the unequal impact of those measures on different countries. Lavergne and Daddieh* summarize some of that thinking as reflected in the World Bankï¿½s position on regional integration. In the absence of workable compensation schemes, the less-industrialized countries in an economic union come out losers in two respects: they lose revenue by purchasing imports from partner countries that pay lower tariffs; and they may lose what little industry they have to competitors in more industrialized neighbouring countries. Compensation schemes such as that of the CEAO are meant to rectify this, but merely shift the fiscal burden onto the exporting country.⁴

4 In the case of the former CEAO (dissolved in March 1994), the principal exporting country was Cote dï¿½Ivoire. With fiscal problems becoming ever more acute as it struggled through the economic crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s, Cote dï¿½Ivoire was unable to sustain its obligations to the community, and a scheme that might have worked ended up grinding to a halt.

The solution advocated by the donor community is for liberalization to proceed along fairly general lines, with only limited preference margins for member countries of any particular scheme (Lavergne and Daddieh*). Such a solution does not solve the fiscal problem resulting from the loss of tariff revenue ï¿½ although actual collection might improve due to the decline of informal trade ï¿½ but it does benefit consumers, through a decline in prices, in a way that trade preferences usually do not. It also increases competitive pressures on local industry. The Achillesï¿½ heel of this approach remains the fiscal problem to which other solutions need to be found, in the form of increased donor support, increased taxation of selected products or activities, or the reduction of certain government expenditures.

Competitiveness under this approach is maintained through currency devaluation, as currently practised in every country of the region now that the CFA franc has been devalued. The combination of trade liberalization with collective devaluation in real terms is a remarkable one in terms of its likely impact on regional trade. Liberalization should stimulate trade in general, while collective devaluation should keep more of that increased trade within the region (Lavergne and Daddieh*). Devaluation can also help resolve the fiscal crisis, by permitting higher taxation of traditional exports.

With trade liberalization and currency devaluation figuring prominently in ongoing economic reform programs, the potential importance of preferential trading arrangements pales in comparison. Trade barriers of the tariff and non-tariff varieties remain excessively high in West Africa, but tend to come down too little and too slowly when this is done as part of preferential trade schemes. Macroeconomic policy reforms are without a doubt more important. Yet macroeconomic policies have been a neglected dimension in regional integration schemes over the last 20 years (Badiane*). A particularly noteworthy aberration was the substantial overvaluation of the CFA franc, for over a decade, cheapening imports from the rest of the world and discouraging exports. The devaluation of the CFA franc should stimulate trade in regional products, and the impact of this single move will probably be greater than all the preference schemes one could develop over a decade of painstaking negotiations. Better coordination of ongoing trade policy reforms could similarly boost regional trade.

One question frequently being posed concerns the extent to which economic integration may already be taking place through informal channels capable of bypassing intercountry trade barriers. In one view, informal trade becomes a form of popular resistance to excessive taxation and interference by the state. Meagher* joins Bach* in taking issue with this notion, arguing that parallel trade as it currently exists is mainly a re-exporting trade based on arbitrage activities that contribute little to the development of regional industry or agriculture. Such trade is organized in networks of large traders with government collaboration to take advantage of disparities in economic policies among neighbouring countries, in the extraction of economic rents from parallel trade. Those who are involved in such trade have little interest in the rationalization of economic policies through the establishment of viable regional integration schemes.

The only solution is not more informal trade, but the coordination and liberalization of economic policies to eliminate the rationale for such trade in the first place, while freeing up the energies of the informal sector for more productive activities. However, because of conflicts of interest at the level of powerful actors involved in parallel trade, it may be difficult to achieve policy reform without recourse to external intervention, through some sort of regionally-focused structural adjustment program.

There is also some question about the extent to which the entrepreneurial energies of the informal trade sector can, in fact, be directed to other ends. According to Bach, the rent-seeking behaviour of the informal sector is fundamentally inconsistent with normal commercial activity, with its more modest profit margins. In his view, any reduction in opportunities for profiteering in cross-border trade will force the participants into more criminal types of activity, like the international drug trade or arms smuggling.

Stryker et al.* take a relatively detailed look at some of the possibilities for trade promotion in the West African subregion. Although their starting point is the development of a general trade strategy for West Africa, with no ï¿½particular reference to regional integration, the greatest opportunities they identify are at the regional level. It could hardly be otherwise. West Africa cannot continue to flourish based on the current range of primary exports whose markets are limited, and does not have the industrial base which would readily allow it to penetrate manufactured export markets in the North. In comparison, there is substantial room for expansion of regional agricultural trade in cereals, livestock, and horticultural products. In the industrial sector, increased trade will depend on the implementation of major policy reforms away from the heavily distorted structure of incentives currently existing in the region, but there is no reason why substantial trade could not develop around basic manufactures.

MONETARY INTEGRATION

The West African Monetary Union (UMOA, now UEMOA) continues to be one of the major assets of the region in matters of integration, and Medhora* points out the various benefits of this scheme. Most notably, the UMOA countries have managed to maintain stable, noninflationary monetary policies, thanks to the insulation of the BCEAO from political interference. The major deficiency of the union was for many years the inability to devalue the CFA, but now that this has been resolved, the benefits of monetary integration, such as the reduction of risk and the decline of transaction costs, could help stimulate regional trade and promote investment in the region.

Cobham and Robson* extend this discussion further to ask whether the experience could not be enlarged to the whole of West Africa, with the European Union playing the support role currently provided by the French under UMOA. Like Medhora, Cobham and Robson stress the advantages of increased macroeconomic stability that an extended monetary union could bring. Of course, the issue is not just one of stability, but also one of policy harmonization between countries to avoid the sort of rent-creating situations currently plaguing trade relations between French-speaking and English-speaking countries of the zone.

The topic covered by these two papers acquires increased importance with the recent emergence of UEMOA. UMOAï¿½s success is largely attributable to the outside support provided by the French, and the supranational features of the UMOA framework. There are lessons in this for other schemes, and if UEMOA is the best way of implementing those lessons, by building upon the UMOA experience, it may constitute the best instrument for moving forward with regional integration in West Africa at this time. This assumes that the member states are willing to pursue the UEMOA initiative aggressively in action as well as words.

The most tantalizing image at this point would involve the extension of UEMOA to other countries (as envisaged in the UEMOA Treaty itself), and its gradual expansion over time to the whole of West Africa. The parallel with the European experience, where the original six countries progressively took on new members on the basis of their initial success, is all too obvious.

SECTORAL APPROACHES

Most current research in the area of regional integration is being done at a sectoral level of analysis, on the agricultural, livestock and industrial sectors. Much more of this kind of down-to-earth strategic thinking and attention to detail is required to stimulate trade in the region along paths consistent with long-term economic viability as discussed in Stryker et al.* (see also Stryker et al. 1994).

The agricultural sector has been the object of substantial research, including work on regional food security and cereals markets undertaken under the sponsorship of the Club du Sahel and the Permanent Interstate Committee to Combat Drought in the Sahel (CILSS).⁵ Pradelle and Snrech (1993) and Brah et al. (1993) have summarized the results of several years of research since plans were first put forward for regional food security in the Sahel at the Mindelo conference in 1986. This sort of research has contributed greatly to our knowledge of trade patterns in the region, and has highlighted the need for greater coordination of food policy to avoid the sort of counterproductive trade in imported cereals resulting from different pricing policies. Also worth emphasizing is the progressive shift of emphasis of such research away from its exclusive focus on the Sahel. This is a logical response, because most trading opportunities in agricultural products involve trade between the Sahelian countries and the Coast, with livestock, cereals, chea butter, and horticultural products moving southward, and tropical fruits, poultry products, kola nuts, and tropical agroindustrial products moving the other way.

5 See also some of the work of the International Food Policy Research Institute, USAID-funded research on the livestock sector, the activities of the Rï¿½seau sur les stratï¿½gies alimentaires, and recent work by the Dutch-funded network, sï¿½curitï¿½ alimentaire durable en Afrique de cinquante-quatriï¿½mes centrale (SADAOC). For a summary of recent work on the livestock sector specifically, see Josserand and Sidibe (1993) or the briefing notes produced by the Rï¿½seau sur les stratï¿½gies alimentaires (1994).

Comparatively little has been published on the industrial sector, despite the high priority that national governments place on industrial development. The industrial policy research network (Rï¿½seau sur les politiques industrielles), managed by the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), is dealing with issues of industrial incentives in francophone Africa, but even in that case, virtually no attention has been paid to regional integration matters until now. There is in fact little intra-African trade in industrial products. Industrial structures are similar in most countries of the subregion, and there is a perception by governments that one cannot have greater regional trade without destroying major parts of national industries. This fear is exaggerated because intraindustrial trade (i.e., trade within a single industry) represents a major phenomenon everywhere else in the world, where it has stimulated growth through increased competition and economies of scale due to specialization.

As Lavergne and Daddieh* point out, there is an urgent need for greater efforts at policy coordination in matters of trade policy reform such as are being carried out under structural adjustment programs. Substantial trade liberalization has already taken place in the region, but there seems to have been virtually no effort to tap this systematically for the reinforcement of regional trade by focusing on products with particular regional trade potential, such as those identified by Stryker et al.* ï¿½ for example, textiles, footwear, cooking utensils, or processed foods and beverages.

The service sector has traditionally been ignored in development theory, and somewhat forgotten in development practice. It is finally receiving more of the attention it deserves. Services were thus brought into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks during the Uruguay Round, and constituted a major part of that agreement. Further work on the topic is being carried out in Africa under the Coordinated Action Programme of Assistance on Services sponsored by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. In the financial sector specifically, there has been some work on increased resource mobilization through the development of regional and subregional capital markets by both the BCEAO and the African Centre for Monetary Studies (ACMS). In West Africa, much of what is to be done under the UEMOA agreements involves the reinforcement of key service functions, including the rationalization of the insurance subsector, the development of regional capital markets, and the harmonization of business law.

Services include a wide range of activities, such as trade, finance, insurance, law, consulting and engineering, transport, health, education, communications, and research. Many of these functions are provided in the form of basic public services in areas such as education, health, and law enforcement, but most services remain in the private sector. The underdevelopment of the service sector is part of Africaï¿½s problem, and Badianeï¿½s contribution to this volume* points to the importance of improved policies in the marketing and transport sectors as a stimulus to increased regional trade. Major gains could probably be realized through productivity growth in the service sector generally, through greater regional collaboration and policy harmonization of the kind mentioned above under the UEMOA scheme.

PUBLIC SECTOR ISSUES

The public sector offers a wide range of opportunities for greater regional collaboration. Prevailing orthodoxy here has evolved in step with neoliberal approaches now dominant in development thinking, and shies away from large public-sector investments in joint industrial facilities (Lavergne and Daddieh*). However, there is plenty of scope for intercountry cooperation in the provision of infrastructure, public services, and government.

INFRASTRUCTURE

The need for improved regional infrastructure for communications, transport, and energy systems is widely recognized in the literature on regional integration and cooperation, and provides an opportunity for collaboration to proceed along project-driven lines that are less likely to encounter political difficulties than other schemes ï¿½ provided that funding can be found. The experience of the Southern African Development Community (SADC, formerly SADCC, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference) is often cited as a model of regional cooperation centred around the development of infrastructure, but comparable achievements in West Africa can be found in the transportation and communications sectors (Bundu*).

Transport and communications have been given the highest priority in both SADCC and ECOWAS because of their importance in achieving goals in other areas such as food security, industrial production, and trade. Much certainly remains to be done, particularly in the communications field, and particularly between francophone and anglophone countries of West Africa, where telecommunications links remain woefully inadequate (in no small part because of the weak domestic telecommunications systems within those countries, Nigeria in particular). In an increasingly information-driven world, international competitiveness, regional trade, and interfirm competition cannot be expected to develop until these barriers are eliminated.

There may also be untapped potential in the energy sphere. According to Sarfoh (1993), the gross potential hydroelectricity that can be generated by Africaï¿½s large water resources has been estimated at about 300 gigawatts, of which less than 4% is currently exploited. Although Sarfoh does not provide the corresponding figures for West Africa (where the potential is surely much less due to the flatness of the terrain), he identifies hydropower as the natural energy base offering the best prospects for satisfying West Africaï¿½s future electricity needs and advocates inter-connecting the region through hydroelectric schemes as a catalyst for political and economic unification.

PUBLIC SERVICES

Regional cooperation could probably be increased in various public-service sectors as well, including health, education, and information services. Numerous health programs are currently operating on a regional basis within the scope of activity of international organizations such as the World Health Organization or projects such as the African AIDS Research Network, which involve multidonor support. In francophone countries, the Organization for Coordination and Cooperation Against Major Endemic Diseases (OCCGE) involves eight countries and nine specialized health research institutes. The equivalent organization for the five countries of anglophone West Africa is the West African Health Community (WAHC). OCCGE and WAHC are currently undergoing a merger, scheduled to be completed by April 1995.

Avocksouma (1994) takes an innovative theoretical approach to regional cooperation in the health sector by focusing on interorganizational links forged independently of conventional regional integration schemes. He scrutinizes the theoretical reasons behind the emergence of such links, in terms of the advantages to the organizations themselves through extended market reach and improved service to clients, improved opportunities for professional development, and enhanced possibilities for the mobilization of outside resources. According to Avocksouma, such interorganizational linkages constitute an important mechanism for the growth of regional cooperation. Such a mechanism has parallels in all types of private enterprise or public-sector activity with a regional dimension, and it is precisely this sort of autonomously driven initiative that authors such as Bourenane* see as essential building blocks in the creation of a true West African ï¿½communityï¿½ with substance beyond the institutional fabric of existing intergovernmental organizations.

Much has been attempted with outside donor support in the fields of higher education, training, research, and technology, with varying degrees of success. Here too, there are possibilities for economies of scale, mutual learning, and information sharing, which can justify the pursuit of regional initiatives (Ekane 1993). Higher education can be a difficult field for donors to support, because of the large recurring costs entailed or the difficulty of finding workable formulas for governing regional institutions. Regional schools such as the former CEAOï¿½s African Centre for Management Studies (CESAG) have encountered difficulties of both types, and institutions with pan-African mandates such as ACMS or the Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) have been forced to scale back the level of their activities in the face of continuing financial difficulties.

However, there exist other formulas than the creation of new regional institutions of higher learning. The alternatives do not resolve all the recurrent cost problems, but they can facilitate the mobilization of national resources or simplify some of the governance issues. One formula which seems to have worked in certain cases is the attachment of regional programs to national institutions. A case in point is the regional graduate-training program in agricultural economics run by the Ivoirian Centre for Social and Economic Research (CIRES), which is attached to the University of Abidjan. However, programs such as these may have to be sustained through high student fees, paid for in CIRESï¿½s case through scholarships supported by outside donors. The sustainability of programs such as these requires that scholarships be funded at least in part by national sources. One solution would be to create a regional scholarship program funded by donors, national governments and the private sector, aimed at students interested in the pursuit of studies outside their country of origin in the region. By pooling support for all disciplines in a single program, this formula would encourage universities in each country to define areas of specialisation in which to excel in order to attract a regional base of students.

Regional initiatives can build upon national programs in other ways. One way is to set regional standards, as do the West African Examinations Council and the African and Malagasy Council of Higher Learning. An interesting program whose success will be worth watching is the InterUniversity Graduate Training Program in Economics for Francophone Africa (PTCI), which builds upon national training programs, but offers regional support for improved facilities and higher standards under the umbrella of the Conference of Economics Research and Training Institutions in Francophone Africa (CIEREA). Other interuniversity collaboration programs of various sorts are also being developed under the Association of African Universities based in Accra. One can thus point to a wide range of formulas for the reinforcement of higher learning through regional cooperation. The key is to let the principle of ï¿½subsidiarityï¿½ be the guide to interventions where regional cooperation can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of national programs without duplicating what is being done at lower levels.

Research and information constitute a final area worthy of special mention because of the economies of scale that can be achieved through the centralization of such activities. It is significant that successful research in the region is often undertaken through regional networks of one sort or another, under the aegis of institutions such as the Institute du Sahel, CODESRIA, IDRC and others. Regional information systems, such as the French-supported Afristat being established in Niamey for the collection and coordination of basic statistical information can also fill an important gap.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Several papers presented at the Dakar conference inquired into the possible role and mandate of regional institutions in areas of government activity such as human rights, regional security, and natural resource management.

Quashigah* considers the possible role of regional institutions in the promotion of human rights, arguing that collective values could be mobilized through regional fora as a way of pressuring individual countries in matters of human rights and fundamental liberties. Quashigah sees the world evolving toward a redefinition of national sovereignty ï¿½ from the absolutist notions of the monarchical era, toward one supportive of the rights of all human beings, including those in foreign countries. In Africa, he points to the gradual recognition of such principles in various charters and treaties and argues that new instruments, such as the proposed regional and subregional parliaments and courts or recourse to humanitarian intervention, could be used for the collective promotion of human rights.

REGIONAL SECURITY

Another area worthy of further investigation is regional security, touched upon by Bundu. * Two papers on this topic were presented at the Dakar conference (Danfulani 1993; Osadolor 1993), and they raised a great deal of controversy about the feasibility of such measures and the dangers of a regional approach in this area of activity given the lack of true democracy in much of the West African subregion. However, the regional impact of the Liberian conflict on neighbouring countries, due to the spill over of violence into Sierra Leone, the exodus of hundreds of thousands of refugees into Cï¿½te dï¿½Ivoire and Guinea, and the spread to all of West Africa of arms and drugs originating in the war zone is a clear illustration of the regional interest in managing this sort of conflict (see Jeune Afrique, 23 February 1995, pp. 30ï¿½33).

NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Finally, certain issues of resource management would benefit from a regional approach due to the lack of correspondence between political boundaries and ecological zones. The need for regional collaboration in river basin management is an obvious case in point, and a number of regional programs designed for this purpose already exist, including the Senegal River Valley Development Organization (OMVS) and the Gambia River Valley Development Organization (OMVG).

Debailleul et al.* address the issue of desertification, which is of concern to the whole of West Africa. The regional scope of this issue has two principal dimensions. First is the shared nature of the problem, because desertification affects all countries in West Africa to some extent. The second aspect is the interdependence of various countries with regard to this issue, as desertification is a major cause of migration from the Sahel to the coast, while deforestation in coastal areas is a likely factor contributing to declining rainfall in northern parts of the region. Desertification control is being pursued at the international, regional, and local levels. Debailleul and colleagues propose a geopolitical approach as a frame of reference for sorting out the actors involved at different levels and thinking strategically about desertification control on a regional scale.

A third example worth noting is in the fisheries sector. Olomola (1993) provides a rationale for better management of Africaï¿½s abundant fisheries through intraregional cooperation, joint efforts at stock management, regional cooperation in fisheries research, and a range of other activities for drawing greater value from the regionï¿½s fisheries.

THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The last two papers in this volume deal with political issues having to do with the sharing of power at the regional level. Ntumba* reviews the three largest integration schemes in Africa and points to the lack of supranationality in these arrangements, which he qualifies as ï¿½inter-statalï¿½ in their approach. Malam-Kandine (1993) makes the same argument in somewhat less detail in a comparison of ECOWAS and CEAO, and both authors contrast this state of affairs with the experience of the European Union, which involved the partial cession of sovereignty by member states at an early stage, in the design of regional institutions. The absence of this condition in the African communities is seen to explain their relative failure compared with the European Union. This argument is bolstered by Medhora* who attributes the relative success of UMOA to the supranationality of the BCEAO over monetary policy.

According to Adewoye,* the problem begins with the political philosophy of nations, which he argues is fundamentally different in Africa than in Europe where a long tradition of ï¿½constitutionalismï¿½ makes it easier to accept limits upon the exercise of power. This in turn has made it easier to engineer the sharing of sovereignty with regional levels of government and justice in Europe than in Africa. Supranationality in Africa is therefore unlikely to materialize in a significant way until constitutionalism itself becomes more strongly entrenched at the national level. However, this may not prevent advances from being made in piecemeal and possibly iterative fashion. Adewoye advocates using the ECOWAS framework itself as a tool for promoting constitutionalism, through the operation of a tribunal, as foreseen in the revised ECOWAS Treaty, which might become increasingly capable of enforcing human rights and checking abuses of power by national governments.

It is widely recognized that existing regional institutions will not succeed until the principle of supranationality is firmly established, as increasingly seems to be the intent with the signature of the Abuja Treaty, the revised ECOWAS Treaty, and the UEMOA Treaty (see Bundu* and Ntumba* for comments on the revised ECOWAS Treaty). Each of these projects involves movement in the direction of increased supranationality through the creation of a regional parliament, the strengthening of a regional tribunal or court of justice, and some move away from rule by consensus, toward qualified majority rule.

THE UEMOA TREATY

The most recent and most significant advances to be made on this front involve the UEMOA Treaty, which was ratified by the Heads of State and Government on 11 January 1994 and ratified by the member states over the following 6 months. The papers in this volume do not dwell extensively on UEMOA, whose Commission and Court of Justice were created in February 1995 (however, see Bach* and Lavergne and Daddieh*). We thus permit ourselves some pause to review the contents of the treaty itself, with regard to the supranationality issue. Of all the regional integration schemes in Africa, UEMOA incorporates the largest measure of supranationality. This is manifested first in UEMOAï¿½s objectives in terms of policy harmonization, which are more far reaching than those of other regional integration schemes. Article 4 of the treaty lists five broad objectives:

Articles 5 and 6 then define UEMOAï¿½s basis principles in the matter of supranationality. Article 5 implicitly recognizes the principle of subsidiarity,⁶ while Article 6 affirms the supranationality of UEMOAï¿½s statutes over those of national governments. The institutional structure proposed for UEMOA incorporates several important innovations in support of this intended supranationality. In addition to features common to the Abuja Treaty and the revised ECOWAS Treaty as mentioned in the previous section, these innovations include: the creation of an UEMOA commission, analogous to the Commission of European Communities, responsible for representing the interests of the Union (Articles 26ï¿½33); the creation of an independent budget authority (cour des comptes); and provision for an independent tax base (Articles 38 and 54). With regard to parliamentary representation, the UEMOA Treaty provides for the creation of an interparliamentary committee as the first step toward the establishment of a regional parliament (Articles 35ï¿½37). More gradual in its approach to parliamentary representation than the Abuja and ECOWAS Treaties, the UEMOA may have a greater chance of actually being implemented.

Taken together, these various arrangements should translate into a substantial degree of supranationality for UEMOA, assuming successful implementation.⁷

⁶ This is our interpretation of the reference to the power. of UEMOAï¿½s organs to edict ï¿½minimal prescriptions and regulatory frameworks, which the Member States will themselves complete as required according to their own constitutional rulesï¿½ [our translation].

REGIONAL COOPERATION AND UNILATERAL ACTIONS

However, development along regional lines can take different paths, and regional cooperation, based on the identification of positive-sum opportunities involving more than one country, may sometimes be the fastest way forward. As Lavergne and Daddieh * point out, donors have a special interest in promoting regional cooperation, as this allows them to avoid having to deal with sovereignty issues. Donors have no control over the sharing of sovereignty which is implied by regional integration schemes, and are sometimes impotent to promote progress if ï¿½political willï¿½ is lacking at the level of participating countries. At the same time, donors do have a special role to play in the financing of infrastructural or other regional cooperation projects.

Economic integration can also proceed through unilateral policy reforms of the kind emphasized by Badiane. * This option has been much ignored by African governments and intergovernmental institutions. However, this is essentially what the neoliberal approach advocated by the World Bank and other donor institutions entails, in calling for unilateral trade liberalization and currency devaluation. Although economic liberalization as pursued under structural adjustment programs is not designed to promote regional trade in particular, its intent is certainly to promote trade, and the fact that it can be pursued unilaterally makes it potentially a powerful and immediately available instrument for the stimulation of regional trade.

The major preoccupation of certain scholars, such as Meagher, * or of institutions such as the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is that this will encourage the overconcentration of regional economies on the export of primary products. This is a legitimate concern, and particular attention should be given to resolving the rift between the World Bank and the ECA and other advocates of protection on matters of trade liberalization, by searching out appropriate combinations of liberalization, protection and supply-side measures capable of encouraging the development of the industrial sector and the growth of alternative exports in Africa.

RESEARCH PRIORITIES

It is conventional to complete reviews such as this one with a discussion of priority areas for research. It is not immediately obvious to what extent research is the key missing ingredient in this field, because the problems and needs are common knowledge. Furthermore, research is unlikely to materialize unless there is a ï¿½marketï¿½ for it. As long as all policy decisions are national in orientation due to the weakness of regional institutions, most research is likely to address national issues.

However, one of the principal obstacles to research to date has been the tendency of researchers to identify with specific models of regional integration. Researchers limiting themselves to the conventional trade-preferences model find they have little new to say. Researchers identifying the Abuja Treaty as the sole model for regional integration may find themselves complaining about the lack of political will of member states or engaging in broad strategic discussions at an abstract level, but will probably not advance very far in operational terms.

The options for research are greatly increased when one recognizes the many options for regional action identified in this volume. Researchers able and willing to broaden their horizons will discover a richness of opportunities open to them at more operational levels of investigation. The so-called ï¿½variable geometryï¿½ concept is particularly interesting, because it permits problems to be attacked on the basis of available opportunities, as understanding develops and solutions are found, in a variable geographic framework. Researchers would then be able to identify specific problems and solutions at a relatively microregional level and be in a position to influence constituencies that are more proximate and manageable than is the case under the current grand schemes. The notion of variable geometry thus provides an answer of sorts to the ï¿½marketï¿½ problem for research, by narrowing the geographic field of intervention. Without listing all the options for research here, one might mention two types of research that would fit this sort of micro- or mesoregional framework of analysis. One would be to pursue fine-tuning of current mechanisms for trade liberalization, to identify mechanisms for liberalizing trade in key industries without necessarily ï¿½deindustrializingï¿½ individual countries or the region as a whole. The other would be to undertake further sectoral studies to identify the complementary policies required to increase trade between neighbouring countries or to pinpoint required areas for increased collaboration in various sectors of public activity.

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