Stanford Center for Internet and Society

There have been a host of apocalyptic warnings in the blogosphere about the First Circuit’s recent decision holding that truth is not an absolute defense to a defamation claim. One blogger dubbed it “the most dangerous libel decision in decades,” and nearly everyone predicts it could have serious implications for journalists. But instead of joining the chorus of First Amendment advocates decrying the decision, I propose we take a step back to calmly examine the appropriate level of First Amendment protection for truthful private information.

This week, Harvard’s Cyberlaw Clinic filed an amicus brief with the Illinois Appellate Court in support of hefty procedural safeguards to protect the anonymity of online speakers in defamation lawsuits. The brief was a collaborative effort of a number of organizations, including Berkman’s Citizen Media Law Project, Gannett Corporation, and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. While I agree with the fundamental premise that plaintiffs should have to do more than simply serve a subpoena to compel the defendants to reveal the identity of online speakers, in my view, the position staked out by the amicus coalition simply goes too far.

Author: Ranjini Acharya

John Alexis Mardas, a former associate of the Beatles, has won the right to bring defamation proceedings against the New York Times and the International Herald Tribune in an English court for publishing an article that described him as a “charlatan” who spread false rumors about the Beatles that may have resulted in the band’s breakup. Evidence in the case established that there were less than 200 hundred hard copies of the article published and approximately 30 hits of the story online. In allowing the case to proceed, Justice Eady of the English High Court held that the determination of “substantial publication,” in the context of online defamation cases, “cannot depend upon a numbers game, with the court fixing an arbitrary minimum according to the facts of the case.”

Author: Allison Pedrazzi Helfrich

In January 2008, Jan Kruska filed defamation, cyberstalking, and other claims against Perverted Justice Foundation, Inc. (and other defendants), for disseminating rumors on various websites that Kruska was a convicted child molester and a pedophile. In December 2008, a U.S. District Court in Arizona dismissed the complaint against Perverted Justice Foundation based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. Perverted Justice is a non-profit corporation based in California and Oregon and has no licenses or designated agent for service of process in Arizona, conducts no business with Arizona, and is not incorporated in Arizona. The court held there could be no general jurisdiction over Perverted Justice “in the absence of these types of contacts that approximate physical presence in Arizona.” The plaintiff argued, however, that Perverted Justice made her a target of its online activities and therefore became subject to jurisdiction in Arizona by expressly aiming its tortious actions at the forum state. Although the court recognized the “effects test” basis for jurisdiction, it held that the “essentially passive nature” of Perverted Justice’s activity in posting a website with a low degree of interactivity is not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction.

The Guardian reports that an internet libel and invasion of privacy case based on allegations over posts made on the blogs of advertising group WPP has been settled out of court. Proceedings had already begun before a jury in the High Court, which hears all UK libel cases. From the Guardian:

About two years ago, I started collecting links to posts, articles, academic discussions and case law about internet libel. I've put this into del.icio.us where I've used the tags internetlaw and internetlibel.