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    Oil and Petroleum Products

    Academic Webinar: The Geopolitics of Oil

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    Carolyn Kissane, academic director and clinical professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University, leads the conversation on the geopolitics of oil.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to the final session of the Winter/Spring 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today’s discussion is on the record. And the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/Academic, if you would like to share these materials with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Carolyn Kissane with us to discuss the geopolitics of oil. Dr. Kissane is the academic director of both the graduate program in global affairs and the graduate program in global security conflict and cybercrime at NYU’s Center for Global Affairs, where she is also a clinical professor. She also serves as director of the energy, climate justice, and sustainability lab in the School of Professional Studies at NYU. She was named in 2013 by Breaking Energy as one of the top ten New York women in energy, and top ten energy communicator. She’s a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and serves on several boards. So, Carolyn, thanks very much for doing this. We really appreciate it. I thought we could begin by talking about how has the geopolitics of oil changed, especially vis-à-vis Russia’s war in Ukraine and OPEC’s recent announcement to cut oil production? KISSANE: Well, first of all, I’d just like to say, thank you so very much for having me. I’m really delighted. I am a big fan of CFR’s Academic Webinars. So, to have the opportunity to participate in this—in this way is very meaningful to me. So, thank you. So, wow. There is so much happening in this space, the geopolitics of oil. This has been a tremendous fourteen months. Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine very much upended the geopolitics of oil because Russia is a significant producer, one of the top three in the world. And it’s—you know, it’s caused a kind of a reshaping, a kind of a remapping of the—of oil geopolitics. And we’ve seen some, you know, shifts in how countries think about oil security, in light of larger questions about broader energy security questions. And also, on top of that, is the ongoing energy transition, coupled with, you know, climate change, and the need to decarbonize. So, there’s just—it’s been quite a—you know, a year and a half, that has really sort of put energy security, and oil security, very much at the forefront of people’s minds. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. I thought maybe you had some really interesting data to show us. And if you could walk us through those—the trends you are seeing and really bring it to life, that would be fantastic. KISSANE: Sure. So, before I do—I have a couple of slides. And before I share my slides, I think it’s really important that, sort of, we understand how interconnected, sort of, the global energy system is, and how interconnected we are, when it comes to the flows of oil. You know, some countries are very well resourced-endowed, so they have oil. And other countries do not, so they need to import oil. There’s really no country in the world that doesn’t need oil for larger national security issues. And I think one of things that many people sort of are not necessarily aware of or think about, is the amount of oil that gets produced every day. So, every day, the world consumes over 100 million barrels a day. And every day, that 100 million barrels has to be—has to be moved. It has to be—you know, as part of getting it into the system, getting it to its respective destinations. And what we’re not seeing—which, maybe some people may have thought that we would see at this point—is we’re not seeing a reduction in demand, but we’re seeing an expansion in demand. And much of that global demand is coming out of Asia. And we’re also, of course, seeing the—with the reopening of China, lots of really interesting questions as to what oil demand will be in China for the 2023-2024 years, whether or not they will—they will, sort of, put extra pressure on global demand. And you know, Irina, just also, you know, it’s—I’m going to share this in my slides. But you know, last week’s decision from OPEC+ to reduce production, of course, had an impact on the price of oil. So when the decision was announced on Sunday, by Monday morning, we saw an uptick in the price. It’s stabilized, but we are sort of looking at $80-plus-a-barrel oil. And again, lots of uncertainty as to what that’s going to mean across economies that are in recessions, experiencing sort of the beginnings of a recession, and sort of what does it mean for the global economy, where we may see sort of more energy inflation. So, one of the things that I really like to do when I teach the geopolitics of oil is sort of show some visuals. Because I think, again, sort of, really reinforcing the interconnected nature of our global energy system, but also sort of seeing where in the world is oil produced, and where in the world are the—are the importers. And also, just a couple of sort of fun pieces on what we have seen, just this—you know, in the last week, of course, some of this—you’ll be familiar with, those in the audience—but this decision on the part of OPEC to reduce production by 1.2 million barrels a day—again, happening at a time, not when we have an excess supply, but when we’re seeing a tight supply across the oil market. So, it came as a bit of a surprise to—you know—to even the most, you know, longstanding analysts and OPEC observers. And again, part of this is directed probably toward self-interests on the part of Saudi Arabia and the oil producers that are really going to make the cuts. But of course, it also has an impact here for those of you that are sitting in the United States. What does it mean then for prices that Americans pay at the gas pump? So, the Biden administration sort of came out after this decision was made in sort of being disappointed, surprised that OPEC would make this decision. Now, it’s also important to sort of recognize that this is not just a singular OPEC decision. This is part of, now, a larger OPEC+. And OPEC+ does also include Russia, as well as other countries like Kazakhstan and Mexico. So, the OPEC that we have historically known is now different, because you have other countries that are not official members but nonetheless are part of what we now refer to as OPEC+. And these are the countries that are part of OPEC, and really the country that’s considered to be sort of in the driver’s seat of OPEC is that of Saudi Arabia, because Saudi Arabia is the largest producer within the OPEC organization, producing anywhere from 10 to 11 million barrels a day. Venezuela has the largest reserves, but it is far from being at capacity, in terms of what it can—what it can produce. So, just to kind of put that into perspective, these are OPEC countries and their respective reserves. And then non-OPEC—the United States being a non-OPEC country, but again, this sort of—this chart to the right shows, you know, again, the world is consuming a little over 100 million barrels a day, expected to increase over 2023 and into 2024, question marks as to when we may see peak oil demand. But again, to sort of link this to energy security—energy security, especially when it’s in the context of oil security—is making sure that we have adequate supply at affordable prices. So, when we see a reduction in supply at a time of tight markets, that suggests that we’re also going to see higher prices that’s going to directly hit vulnerable economies. And so, again, just to sort of point out sort of where in the world sort of are the top three oil producers: the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Russia remains in the top three. Canada as well, our, you know, neighbor to the north. And China is also a producer of oil. The United States figure here also includes gas liquefied, so liquid petroleum, which the United States is endowed with a lot of both oil and natural gas. And then the top oil consuming countries, you have U.S., China, and India. Now, the United States is not the largest importer. That position is now held by China. But as far as consumption goes, we consume over 20 million barrels a day. Again, big question mark about China, in terms of whether or not we will see higher demand coming out of China over the next year, two years, with China’s reopening and what is being, you know, discussed as revenge tourism. And more Chinese who have accumulated a lot of savings, 2.1 trillion, how are they going to use that savings and whether or not, after three years of being under lockdown restrictions, whether or not we’ll see impacts to demand. And I think Russia is—there’s lots of questions about Russia. And this is now—we’re fourteen months into, you know, Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine—and I emphasize reinvasion, because oftentimes, we forget that, you know, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. But Russia is still moving its oil. And up until, you know, a few months ago, its overall production and exports were as high—at some points, even higher—than pre-invasion. Now, you have new countries that are takers of Russian oil, and they’re buying it at discounted prices. We see Turkey, Singapore, China has been a big buyer, as well as India, that they have been buying discounted Russian oil. Lots of interesting questions that we could discuss about the oil price cap and seaborne embargo to Europe. But I think the takeaway from this slide is that Russia continues to produce oil, continues to sell it, selling at a discounted price, but there are still many countries in the world that are eager to take Russian oil. And again, I’m not going to go into this, but I just love this slide, to just emphasize the—you know, the world’s pipelines. These are the pipelines that help sort of the transit of oil. Something also that’s really unique and interesting to look at is just tanker traffic, so, the tankers that carry oil around the world. But again, you know, there are a lot of pipelines, so twenty-three—two thousand, three hundred, and eighty-one operational oil and gas pipelines. Again, these are—it’s moving a lot of the oil that is consumed every day. And then finally, is this—is—you know, one of the things that we oftentimes—we think about the hundred million barrels a day that the world is consuming, over 75 percent of the world’s oil is controlled, managed by state-owned oil companies. So, Saudi Aramco being one, PDVSA of Venezuela being another. But it’s really important to sort of recognize the position that state-owned companies have. The rest is controlled or managed by international oil companies—ExxonMobil, Chevron, ENI, Total, and a host of other—host of other companies. But again, I think the—you know, to understand that NOCs, as they’re referred to, are very, very important for understanding their role in the larger context of the geopolitics of oil. And again, what we saw last week coming out of OPEC, this decision, this is also being driven by state budget concerns. This is—again, it’s about the production of oil, but it’s also about, you know, governments and their budgets. And oftentimes, you know, there is a desire to add more, rather than—you know, more revenues rather than less. So, those are the slides that I have. And I hope that they sort of provide some sort of context, and a little bit of, you know, that we can discuss in the questions that I really look forward to answering from the audience. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Carolyn. That was great. So now, we’re going to go to all of you for your questions and comments. (Gives queuing instructions.) All right, so I’m going to go to the first raised hand in the thing. Amadine Hom, go to you first, and please accept the—unmute yourself. (Pause.) You are still muted. (Pause.) OK, I don’t know—are you there? Oh, I think—OK. Let’s go to Morton Holbrook. Q: Yes, good afternoon. Dr. Kissane, what a shocking presentation—(laughs)—a hundred million barrels a day and it’s going up, notwithstanding the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015. Is that agreement simply a dead letter, or is it having any effect on oil—on fossil fuel production, particularly oil production? Or what’s the best scenario, in terms of reducing dependence on fossil fuels, considering the oil market? Thank you. KISSANE: Well—hi, Morton, thank you so much for that excellent question. Yeah, that’s kind of why I emphasize that number, is because a lot of people sort of just aren’t aware of how much oil we continue to consume, and again, what the demand expectations are moving forward. And these demand expectations are, you know, coming out of forecasts from the International Energy Agency. So, I think there’s a big question as to when we see peak demand. And, you know, if you look at BP scenarios, they expect peak demand to happen, you know, before 2030, where, as, you know, others kind of contest that they—that they think that peak demand won’t happen until after 2030. I mean, again, a lot depends on, you know, what we are now experiencing in the energy transition, and how, sort of quickly are we—can we transition away from oil. I think what’s really critical, when we’re looking at oil, is oftentimes we think only about the transportation sector. So we’re thinking about cars, we’re thinking about planes, you know, we’re thinking about trucks, and tankers, and all these things. But it’s petrochemicals, you know? There’s just a lot of oil that also goes into fertilizer. So, it really is across our economy, and across economies, across the global system. One of the things that I always tell my students is even during COVID, where you had many countries, right, much of the world was experiencing some level of lockdown, we did have a reduction in oil demand, but it wasn’t—it wasn’t like 20 million barrels. It was under ten. So, the fact that now it’s 2023, the world has reopened, it’s really hard to sort of see, or to know with certainty, is when we’re going to see that—see that reduction in demand. Now, I think with the Paris Agreement, what’s also important is—to note is, you know, if you’re—if you’re in the oil and gas space—and I was just at a conference earlier this morning where this was a point of conversation—was, you know, what are the companies doing to reduce the emissions from production? So, how are they integrating carbon capture, sequestration, you know, how are they managing the emissions that come from the production of fossil energy—in this case that we’re talking about, oil. And I think one of the things that—I think if you sort of follow oil markets, or a country like Saudi Arabia, they are marketing low-emission oil. Now, we could—you know, we could sort of challenge, well, what does that—you know, what does that really mean? But you are having, you know, countries that are now sort of competing to state that they have lower emitting carbon in the production—in the production of oil. And that’s a whole other interesting sort of thing to look at, in the context of the geopolitics of oil, is to kind of understand the variation across emissions, across different countries, in the production of oil. So, we are—you know, again, we are going to be going into COP-28 this fall. Again, we are not seeing—you know, and we haven’t seen a, you know, reduction in fossil energy demand. Again, lots of people are sort of, you know, hoping that we’ll start to see it sooner rather than later. But for the time being—and again, you know, to Irina’s first question, that, you know, the last fourteen months, and with, you know, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it has both shown us that, you know, Europe is sort of seeking to hasten the energy transition, by building out more renewable energy, and creating more opportunities to buy electric vehicles. But there’s still big swaths of the world that, you know, are still, and have yet to move towards, you know, really reducing—and that are actually going to see higher demand moving forward, as their economies grow. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Jovana Vujanic, who is a graduate student at Lewis University: How big of an—of an impact will the decision of the Saudi energy minister to cut oil production have on the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia? KISSANE: Love the question, thank you so much. Yeah, no, it’s a great one. So, my take is that, of course, this decision came as a bit of a surprise, and it wasn’t something that the United States, you know, wanted. But I would say that the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been very tense for the last ten years. And as part of that—there are lots of different reasons for that, but this is yet—kind of another thing that Saudi has done. And again, I think it’s also—Saudi has taken a non-alignment policy with relation to its position on Russia and Ukraine. So, it continues to—you know, it continues to have a relationship with Russia. It also has the relationship with Ukraine. As we saw, you know, China just brokered a very significant deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran. You know, again, Saudi Arabia and Iran are two—are two important producers for China. So, China is a large importer of oil. So, if you go back to World War—the end of World War II, that’s when the United States established the oil-for-security relationship with Saudi Arabia. And as we have grown, sort of, more—I wouldn’t say independent, but our—as our own oil production has increased, especially through the shale revolution, our dependence on the Middle East and Saudi Arabia, more specifically, has shifted. So, I think we’re seeing a very different Saudi Arabia today, which I think is going to be a challenge for the United States. I think it’s going to be very interesting to see what the summer holds. Last summer, the Biden administration did tap into the U.S. strategic petroleum reserves, the largest—the largest take in the history of the reserves, which started in 1975, you know, taking 180 million barrels out, you know, not because there was massive supply disruptions. But because, you know, as the administration said, it was—you know, it was—it was—it was a war—it was a war-specific decision, because the—you know, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was causing energy prices to skyrocket. And to cushion the American consumer, and to better cushion the, sort of, the global economy, the United States withdrew from the SPR. So I think the summer is going to be very interesting. But I think we’re going to see, definitely, much more attention in the years to come, between the United States and Saudi Arabia. It’s not the relationship of the past. This is a kind of a very new relationship. That’s a great question. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Thank you, let’s go Curran Flynn, who has a raised hand. Q: Hello? FASKIANOS: We can hear you, but we’re getting feedback. So you might have two devices open. Q: Can you hear me now? FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: That’s better. OK. FASKIANOS: That’s better. Thank you. Thank you so much. Q: So, I’m here at King Fahd University in Saudi Arabia, right next to Aramco, here with my class from international relations. And one of my students has a question, Nasser al-Nasir (ph). Here he is. Q: So, thank you, Mrs. Carolyn. My question is: How could Russia’s use of alternative transportation methods, such as the East Siberian Pipeline to China, impact the U.S. market, the domestic market, and the role of the SPR, given potential insurance workarounds from Russia’s side such as ensuring Russian tankers through their RDIF fund? And thank you to Mrs. Irina. KISSANE: Thank you. And, Dr. Flynn, thank you so much for having your students join this webinar. So, I’m a little—so, the question is about the East Siberian Pipeline? Just could you—would you mind repeating it? I just want to make sure I have it—I’m clear on the question. Q: So, how could Russia’s use of alternative transportation methods, such as the East Siberian Pipeline to China, impact the U.S. energy markets, I mean domestically, and the SPR, given potential insurance workarounds from Russia’s side such as ensuring Russian tankers to the RDIF fund? KISSANE: Yeah, and that’s a great question. You know, I think that, you know, begs a lot of things that we could be looking at, right, in terms of, you know, Russia’s kind of ability or capacity to sort of work around, or find workarounds, to the sanctions that were imposed. And I think we’ve seen sort of new markets—so, this kind of reshaping of the energy map with oil, we see that as—kind of in technicolor, right, whereas, you know, a lot of Russian oil would go west, is now going east, you know, China, India, being takers, and of course, you know, other countries as well. You know, what will be its impact on the—on the U.S. market? I think that’s—you know, again, I do think the sanctions were sort of carefully put into place, so that there wouldn’t be massive disruptions, so we—again, you know, Russia produces over 10 million barrels a day, and about 7 million of those barrels are exported. So, you know, if we lost all of that, that would be a—you know, that would cause some very significant economic disruption globally. We already saw, you know, impacts to sort of grains, grain exports, and food security in many different parts of the world. So, you know, Russia is finding different ways. You have shadow tankers that Russia is using to move—to move its oil—as you pointed out, the East Siberian pipeline. You know, I think there’s only so much the United States can do, or—and European countries that are part of the sanctions regime, can do to curtail Russian exports of oil. But I think that—you know, I think Russia, again, has a—has a desire, and also, you know, revenue needs—they’re funding a very expensive war—that they’re finding ways to get their—to get their oil out. I think an interesting question is, you know, what does this mean in the years ahead, the lack of investment, for example, that’s going into Russian energy infrastructure, a lack of, sort of, any kind of Western investment that is—that is going in, and what that is going to mean. But again, you know, I think, to your question, I think we will see some—you know, we are seeing some impacts, right? There’s a big question as to what—you know, what the next six months to a year will look like, with regards to the reduction from OPEC, and if we were to see a deeper curtailment on Russian oil. And you know, would the United States then tap more into the SPR? We’re now at—you know, we’re down to seven hundred thousand barrels, which, of course, is not insignificant. But we also sort of have to be, you know, judicious about how we use the SPR. But thank you for the question. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Michael—let’s see— Trevett, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Southern Mississippi: China and other countries claim there are petroleum reserves under the South China Sea. What are your estimates of the potential amount there, and has China begun to extract any of this oil? KISSANE: Michael, thank you so much. That’s a great question. So, China already is an oil producing country, so you do have oil production in China. In the South China Sea, I can’t—I can’t say exactly. I know that there have been geological tests that have shown the reserves. Again, you do have—you know, you do have territorial concerns about sort of where—is this—you know, can China—can China tap those—or seek to explore and tap those reserves, again, if there are—if there is contention over the territory in which these reserves are located? So you know, China, again—one of the things that’s very interesting about China is that China is an oil producer, but China has seen, over the last, you know, the last decade, they have seen that they have experienced peak demand. So—I mean, sorry. Peak supply. So, they are not producing as much as they used to. And so you’re seeing a year-on-year reduction in the producing capacity. You know, if you go back maybe five or six years ago, there was lots of questions about if China could kind of replicate what happened in the United States around the shale oil revolution. I think one of the big challenges for China is that, of the—you know, where the shale reserves are located, it’s not near water, lots of questions as to—and some of it—basically, some of the tests have shown that it’s—it definitely is proving harder that, you know, they cannot sort of model the same level of development that we have seen in the United States. So, yeah, no, I think in the South China Sea, again, I think we—it’s potentially possible that we might see it. I wouldn’t—I wouldn’t—I wouldn’t say it’s soon. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m taking the next question from Rob Warren at the Anglo-American University of Prague. This question also got an upvote: How do you foresee Venezuela’s role in the global oil market changing moving forward? And can it be reintegrated into the global economy? KISSANE: Oh, these are all fantastic questions. Thank you all so much. Yeah, Venezuela is—again, you know, Venezuela has—they have the largest reserves in the world. As part of this webinar, right, you—CFR had a—kind of a primer on Venezuelan, and kind of—you know, you look at sort of where Venezuela is. And one of the biggest challenges confronting Venezuela is both its politics, but it’s also—it basically—you know, you don’t have—you don’t have international oil service providers in the country. I think the only—the only one now that the U.S.—the U.S. has sort of given a sanctions exemption to, is that of Chevron. But I think—yeah, I mean, if you were to see, you know, kind of shifts in the political regime, and you were to see more openness, then I think you could imagine, you know, Venezuela having an opportunity, or a pathway forward, to be more integrated into the global energy system, and the global oil system. You know, I think one of the big problems that Venezuela faces is that most of its infrastructure is really old at this point. And it would need a significant amount of reinvestment to get it up to a place that it could sort of meet its potential. So, you know, Venezuela is one of these countries that’s not producing as much as it could, right? It has the potential to be producing 2 million-plus more barrels per day. But you know, we’ve seen that they really have just—they went into freefall. So, I think that’s a big issue. And another big issue, which—God, it goes back to an earlier question—is that of emissions. So, the oil that comes out of Venezuela is a very, very heavy oil. So, it’s—it has very large carbon emissions associated with the production of that oil. So, that, I think, is—again, as we—you know, think about the emissions from oil production in countries that are sort of seeking to kind of market themselves as low-emission producers, you know, Venezuela definitely will have a very hard time recouping its—where its oil sector was. Again, it has the capacity, it has the reserves. But getting that—getting that oil out of the ground right now, you have a lot of significant above-ground risks. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Clemente Abrokwaa. Raised hand, so please unmute yourself. Q: Can you hear me, please? FASKIANOS: Yes, we can. Q: Thank you. Thank you so much for your—for your talk. I was also very shocked about the amount of barrels that we consume every day. (Laughs.) I didn’t know that. But anyway, I’m from Penn State University. And my question is: You just mentioned about the above-ground, you know, effects. And—so the movement towards, like, electric vehicles and so on, how do you think it is going to affect the African continent? KISSANE: Thank you. Q: I am—I’m thinking, you know, the economies, and then infrastructure. It will be very difficult for them to—(laughs)—move with the rest of the world in terms of electric vehicles, and so on. I just wanted your take on that. KISSANE: Thank you, Clemente. It’s an excellent question. Yeah, I mean, you have countries across the African continent that not only have oil reserves, but are already producing, right? Nigeria is a—is an oil-producing country, also has more capacity, but again, you have some above-ground risks. You also have the need for investment of new infrastructure. I think one of the things that has been very interesting—and I think it’s getting—it’s getting more attention, as it deserves, is how Western governments are—some of—I think a challenge across Africa is that a lot of Western governments have sort of said, listen, we’re not going to invest in fossil fuels—or also, financial institutions, Western financial institutions—we’re not going to invest in fossil fuels, or new projects that are fossil-based. And that—you know, that’s problematic when you look across the African continent, where you still don’t have, you know, 100 percent energy access. You know, the idea of the transition to electric vehicles, which is taking a very, very long time, even here across the—across developed economies—so the need for the infusion of more capital to go into, you know, across the continent of Africa for oil and gas, that’s for their economies and for their own economic growth, I think, is really, really pivotal. And I think this is something that, you know, is being discussed across multilateral financial institutions. And also, you know, is it hypocrisy, right, for Western banks that have, you know, kind of funded the oil and gas industry, or helped to fund the oil and gas industry in the United States and many different parts of the world, and that are now sort of not allowing those funds to flow to Africa. And they have the—again, they have the—they have the resources. So you know, is it—you know, the equity of some of these decisions that are being made, I think, is one that’s—is one that’s really important. And again, I—you know, I said earlier in this talk, is that, you know, all—most of the demand for oil is not coming from North America and from Europe. All of the demand that we’re seeing and new demand that we’re going to see, is coming from Asia, and is going to come from Africa. So again, you know, how are we going to make sure that that demand is met, again, going back to that idea of energy security, so there is—there is accessibility, so there is reliable sources of energy at affordable prices, you know, without sort of thinking about kind of a whole-of-energy approach. So, I think it’s very—it’s a very complex issue. And I think, you know, Western banks who have sort of taken very sharp positions on what they will and will not fund, when it comes to new oil and gas projects, are getting sort of challenged as to, you know, what does that mean, then, for, you know, countries across Africa that are still very much in need of more energy, not less. And again, recognizing that, you know, EVs that, again, are still—are—you know, we’re seeing adoption here in the United States and across Europe, but it’s a big, big, big adoption in China. But it’s very uneven. So how do we ensure greater energy security for the continent of Africa, I think, is a really critical question. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’ll take the next question from Kyle Bales, who is a senior at Lewis University in Romeoville, Illinois: How is the war between Russia and Ukraine having an effect on the progress of the European Green Deal? Maybe you can tell us what the European—define the European Green Deal for us, Carolyn, give us the context for that. KISSANE: Yes, so, again, this is another fantastic question. Yeah, the European Green Deal, it’s—this is—this is great. Yeah, I mean, a lot of people would say that the European Green Deal now is—that the—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sort of said, hey, this is why the Green Deal is so important. This is why we really need to more quickly transition to renewable energy, because look what—look what happened when we were dependent on Russia for over 30 percent of our natural gas. And look, when Russia, you know, illegally invades Ukraine and suddenly weaponizes gas, we are left very energy-insecure. It affects—it affects consumers. It affects industry across the continent. So, I think we’re seeing, not just through the Green Deal, but we’re also seeing through, sort of European green industrial policy—so in some ways, akin to what, you know, we put into effect in—this past summer, is the Inflation Reduction Act. And we’re seeing almost, kind of, this industrial competition around clean energy technologies. And so, Europe is investing—you know, I think it’s about $250 billion, the United States, it’s about 370 billion—towards the—kind of the energy transition, and helping to support domestic industries and companies to—you know, to be able to, you know, develop the technologies, and to have the, you know, the opportunity to contribute to the energy transition. So, I think one thing, though—whenever I talk about Europe, it’s really important, is to sort of recognize that, you know, when you look across Europe, you have very different policies and kind of approaches, to sort of thinking about energy, and how quickly some countries want to transition and can transition, whereas others, you know, are probably going to experience a slower transition. So, just really interesting example, as you talked about the Green Deal, is the EU taxonomy, the green taxonomy, that went into effect in the—January of 2022. And there, you had, like, really a lot of contention between France and Germany, because France wanted to make sure that nuclear was part of the green taxonomy. Germany was opposed, right, but Germany wanted to make sure natural gas was part of the green taxonomy. So ultimately, in the end, both natural gas and nuclear—and again, this was—this predated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But in the EU green taxonomy, you have—you know, you have both nuclear and natural gas, in addition to other renewable energies that can make up this taxonomy, that includes specific measures towards adaptation and mitigation for climate change. So you know, I think you’re seeing this kind of—some people call it a race, a competition. You know, ideally, it’s—you know, we’re kind of working together to—because we’re all sort of going in the same direction—to, you know, support the transition, and to reduce—to reduce carbon emissions, and to bring in more, sort of, cleaner energy technologies into our system. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Dr. Laeed Zaghlami. Q: Yes, good afternoon. This is Laeed—good afternoon, Irina. Good afternoon, Carolyn. I’m very pleased to be part of your program. Just to—want to be back to Africa and particularly to Nigeria, how practical the two projects that Nigeria is advocating for pipelines, one from—through Algeria, and the other one to Morocco through western African countries? How practical are these pipelines to supply gas to Europe and parts of some African countries? FASKIANOS: And Dr. Zaghlami, you are at Algiers University, correct? Q: Indeed, Irina, yes. I am professor at University of Algiers, faculty of information and communication. FASKIANOS: Thank you. KISSANE: Dr. Laeed, can I—can I keep you on for just one second? Can I ask you, what is the—what is the status right now? Is it—it’s planned, under construction? Where is—what is the status of those two pipelines? My understanding is that it’s—they’re proposed, but— Q: Yes, well, actually in—practically, the pipeline between Algeria and Abuja, which means through Niger and so forth, is already in progress, whereas the other project, through thirteen western African countries, they are supposed to be implemented by 2047. But is it—is there any political game or something of strategic—(inaudible)—how practical, how logical, how efficiently will be for Nigeria to have two similar project(s)? KISSANE: Yeah, no, it’s—again, thank you for the question. You know, pipelines, again, that’s why I wanted to show the—(laughs)—kind of the map of pipelines, is because, you know, a lot of pipelines transverse, you know, multiple countries, right? And this is—this requires not just, you know, a lot of cooperation, but it requires technically. It also can be very complex to build—to build pipelines. And when you’re talking about something like, as you—as you point out, these are, you know, crossing many countries. You know, I think one of the—again, one of the issues is whether or not—since, you know, what already is under construction, I think you can, you know, with confidence, that one will be completed. Anything that’s not yet under construction—and again, the timeline, 2047, is way out there—a lot of—a lot of uncertainty as to what the status of those projects will be moving forward, for various reasons, in terms of making sure that the investments are there. Someone I know that studies pipelines, he says, you know, until the steel is in the ground, you don’t have the pipeline, and so until you know that you’ve got that, you know, you’ve got all the OKs, and you feel that kind of security of being able to build it, and being able to provide the resources to supply it and to move it. I think Algeria has been a really interesting case that hasn’t gotten enough attention, in terms of Algerian gas, that has—that has helped support Europe. Over the last years, we’ve seen an increase in Algerian gas going into Europe. Again, a lot of attention on U.S. LNG and the increase of liquefied natural gas exports into Europe, but also Algeria has been, you know, very important for helping to support European energy security, and make up for some of the losses of the—of the Russian gas. And I think we’ll see more attention on Algeria, and Algeria’s role as a—you know, as an important source of energy, especially, you know, gas, going into—going into Europe, moving forward. FASKIANOS: So, I’ll take the next written question from Vincent Brooks, who is at Harvard and Diamondback Energy board of directors: How do you view the purchasing of discounted Russian oil by India, in particular relative to the purchasing by China? How are they using the oil purchased? And are you seeing more internal usage or external profit-making sales in places like Africa? And what are the implications of all of this? KISSANE: Right, great. Great question. So, all of the above—(laughs)—in some ways, right? There is definitely sort of profits that are being made. You know, I was—I was talking about this last week with someone, and you know, if you sort of put your shoe—put yourself in the shoes of India, right, so, India is a—is a rapidly growing economy, 1.4 billion. You know, if you had—if you have very high energy inflation and high oil prices, that’s going to have ripples effects across the Indian economy. And so, you know, when you have a kind of opportunity to buy, you know, pretty steep discounted oil, which, you know, they had been able to buy from Russia, you know, for purposes of national security, they’ve been buying the oil. And one of the things that’s very interesting about India is that, actually, India has been building out its refining capacity. So, a lot of that oil is both for domestic, and some of it is being sort of re-exported. But I think what we’ve seen is that they’re using that oil to also sort of enhance their capacity and capabilities as a rapidly emerging, refining power in Asia. And we see that in some ways in China, too. So, China, even though oil demand was down in 2022, much of the oil that they were buying from Russia went into its strategic supplies, which, you know, they now have access to. And again, I think, you know, a big question is what we’re going to see moving forward around oil demand in China. Wood Mackenzie just published a really interesting piece, kind of very bullish, on the expectations for oil demand in China, so whether or not they’re going to continue to buy, you know, Russian oil—and again, sort of taking advantage of these lower prices, you know. And I think—I think one of the things that—it’s kind of an inconvenient truth, whereas a lot of this oil trading used to happen in Europe, so European trading houses were kind of the main—the main points of Russian oil trade. A lot of that has been moved out, so, you know, Russia has found ways to kind of bypass some of the sanctions, and have set up—in some cases, they’ve set up trading houses. And some of those trading houses have been sort of set up in places that, you know, that they can sort of, again, bypass the compliance to the sanctions. And you have some—you have some Russian oil traders that are making a lot of money—(laughs)—selling discounted oil, and then reselling it. A really interesting case, a couple of months ago, was out of Malaysia. Malaysia announced—or, in the, you know—that they were—that 1.5 million barrels were produced and sold, but only—Malaysia doesn’t produce that much. So, those were Russian barrels that were sort of being sold under, sort of, the Malaysian—under the Malaysian barrel. So, again, I think China and India have, you know, have taken advantage. Some of this has, again—as I said, has been re-exported. And some of it, you know, has been re-exported through petroleum products, because China and India, you know, both are building and have refining capacity. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Bhakti Mirchandani at Columbia University: What global trajectory do you see for nuclear? The Russia-Ukraine crisis has taken some of the refining capacity offline, and nuclear has the potential to change the geopolitics of energy. And so what steps can be taken to foster nuclear energy? KISSANE: Bhakti, thank you. And I was just at Columbia earlier today for the Center for Global Energy Policy’s conference. Yeah, nuclear is very interesting, right? So when we’re thinking about, you know, decarbonizing our energy systems, you know, nuclear plays a very important role, because it’s zero-emitting. So in certain parts of the world—China being one, Saudi Arabia—you know, you have a lot of new nuclear build. You know, in other parts of the world, you have a lot of contention about nuclear. We saw that even in Germany, which have, you know, three remaining nuclear power plants. And even in the midst of massive energy crisis over the last year, there was still sort of pushback about, no, those nuclear power plants need to be shut down, whereas you would think, OK, in light of energy insecurity, let’s keep them open. So, you know, France is an interesting country. France had planned to reduce its nuclear capacity by 50 percent. But this past year, they pivoted and they’ve said, no, we’re actually going to build out more nuclear, and we’re sort of—we’re totally scrapping that idea of reducing nuclear energy. And nuclear is very important for France’s electricity system. Sweden has also announced that they are going to build new nuclear, and they’re going to increase by, I think, almost 50 percent. Again, part of this is their—to meet their targets of net zero. We also see Japan. Japan, you know, the Fukushima disaster really turned Japanese—the Japanese public off of nuclear. Very, very deep opposition to restarting the nuclear power plants. But this past year, even though there’s still safety concerns on the part of the public, the public is also very concerned about energy insecurity and higher prices. So, nuclear being a domestic source of energy. So, I think when you look at, you know, net-zero pathways, I have not seen a net-zero pathway that does not include nuclear. So, here in the United States, the net-zero America project out of Princeton, very important place for nuclear. We just have a really hard time—(laughs)—building nuclear at cost, so it’s very expensive. Usually, it’s significant cost overruns. And of course, there is the—I think they have a really significant PR problem. People—there’s still a lot of concern about the safety of nuclear. So, I think to your point, it’s very, very important for decarbonizing energy systems, but you’re going to see, I think, very disjointed approaches. Some countries are going—are embracing nuclear, and other countries are sort of doubling down on their opposition, and are not going to allow nuclear to be part of the energy system. FASKIANOS: We have so many questions, and we are just not going to get to them all. So, I’m going to take the next question from Christian Bonfili, who’s at Torcuato di Tella University in Argentina. So, do you think, Carolyn, that the landscape resulting from the Ukraine invasion by Russia, vis-à-vis securitization of gas and energy between Europe and Russia, could accelerate energy transition toward greener energy? KISSANE: Great question. I think in Europe, it is. And I think, you know, many analysts would agree that—the IEA, for example—you know, you had the, you know—how does Europe continue—you know, to enhance and achieve energy security without the dependence on Russia gas? And a lot of that is through renewable energy. You also have a lot of new attention on hydrogen, and the role that hydrogen will play. I think—I think Europe is being cautious, and so they are not saying that they are going to completely move away from gas, so as earlier questions, are they getting gas from Algeria, or are they getting gas from Norway? Are they getting more gas from the United States in the form of liquefied natural gas? And then also an uncomfortable truth is they continue to get liquefied natural gas from Russia. So, we’ve seen an increase in LNG from Russia going into Europe. That said, I think all in, you are seeing that, you know, countries across Europe are saying, OK, you know, how can we enhance our energy security? How do we build more sort of domestic energy sources? Solar, wind, we’re seeing, you know, more rapid deployment. You’ve got a lot of questions about supply chains and things like that, but I think—overall, I think the answer would be that it’s quickening the energy transition. FASKIANOS: So, I will take the moderator prerogative to just ask the final question for you to close on. And just to give us your top three—what are the major challenges for the geopolitics of oil, as you look out over the next five- to ten-year horizon, that you would leave us with, to be looking for? KISSANE: OK. You know, so I think what we saw, right, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United States. We also have a, you know, a hot war, cold war, depending on, you know, the term you want to use, between the United States and China, and lots of sort of questions as to what that’s going to look like. I think there’s—you know, I think there’s concern that, you know, we’re not reducing demands, but we’re seeing tightening supply. And so that’s going to have, you know, very significant impacts for economies, especially economies that are already very fragile, economically fragile, politically fragile. So that concerns me a lot, in terms of, you know, what happens when, you know, economies don’t have adequate access to energy to make sure that their industries, that their—that consumers, you know, are able—that the lights can stay on, and you can get—you know, if you’re dependent on cars, you’re depending on trucks, like, all these kinds of things are really, really critical. So, I think we have to be very cautious moving forward, that we don’t take more out of the system before we have adequately set up the system to be resilient, and to be able to sort of meet the energy security demands that are not—are not—they’re not decreasing. I think they are increasing and becoming even more complex. So, I think there’s a lot of concerns and a lot of uncertainty. And you know, this definitely is going to be an area to watch in the years ahead. FASKIANOS: Carolyn Kissane—Kissane, excuse me—thank you very much for shaping and sharing this discussion, for sharing your terrific insights with us, and to all of you for your questions and comments. I’m really sorry that we could not get to them all. But we only have an hour. (Laughs.) KISSANE: Thank you. FASKIANOS: You can follow Carolyn on Twitter at @carolynkissane, and we will be announcing the fall Academic Webinar lineup in the CFR Academic Bulletin. If you’ve not already subscribed, you can email us to subscribe. Send us an email, [email protected]. Again, I encourage you to share with your students our CFR paid internships announcement. We also have fellowships for professors. You and they can go to CFR.org/careers, follow us at @CFR_Academic, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. Thank you all again. Good luck with your finals. Carolyn Kissane, thank you so much. KISSANE: Thank you. It was a pleasure. Great. FASKIANOS: And we look forward to your continued participation in this series. KISSANE: Thank you very much. Appreciate everyone’s questions. Bye. (END)

    Webinar with Carolyn Kissane and Irina A. Faskianos April 12, 2023

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Inu Manak

Fellow for Trade Policy

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Renewing America and Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies

Rethinking International Rules on Subsidies

September 6, 2023
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Inu Manak is a fellow for trade policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). An expert in international political economy, Dr. Manak’s research focuses on U.S. trade policy and the law and politics of the World Trade Organization. At CFR, she researches and writes on trade politics and institutions, dispute settlement, and development. She is regularly called on to speak about the USMCA, WTO reform, subsidies and industrial policy, the intersection of trade and climate, and executive overreach on trade. In 2021, she published The Development Dimension: Special and Differential Treatment in Trade (Routledge Focus) with James Bacchus. She is currently writing a book about U.S. trade policy’s bipartisan shift toward protectionism.  

Previously, Dr. Manak was a research fellow at the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies and a junior visiting fellow at the Centre for Trade and Economic Integration at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. 

Dr. Manak is a book review editor for World Trade Review and associate editor of the International Economic Law and Policy Blog. She is also a participating scholar in the Robert A. Pastor North America Research Initiative at American University. She serves on the advisory board of the Center on Inclusive Trade and Development at Georgetown Law. 

Dr. Manak received a PhD in government from Georgetown University, an MA in international affairs from American University’s School of International Service, and a BA in political science (First Class Honors) from Simon Fraser University. 

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  • Inu Manak

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    Trump's dealmaker name on the line in high stakes tariff talks Link

    Featuring Inu Manak via Yahoo Finance July 12, 2025

  • Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies

    Trade Tools for Climate Action: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform

    Although fossil fuel phase-outs are critical to achieving global climate goals, protections granted through Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions to foreign-owned coal operations expose governments to costly litigation, threatening to thwart state action. 

    by Jennifer Hillman, Helena Kopans-Johnson and Inu Manak July 9, 2025

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    Update on the Ninety-Day Pause: Tariffs and U.S. Trade Policy

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    Panelists discuss the latest announcements from the Trump administration on tariffs and trade agreement negotiations, the likelihood of extended pauses on tariffs for specific countries, and how businesses and the market are navigating trade policy uncertainties. CVETKOVA: Thank you, Alexis. Welcome, everyone, to today’s on-the-record Council on Foreign Relations virtual meeting on U.S. trade policy and tariffs. My name is Dima Cvetkova. I work for Moody’s Corporation. And I have the great pleasure of moderating this session. We have an excellent panel of experts joining us today who will help us disentangle the trade signal from the noise. We have with us Jennifer Hillman from Georgetown University Law Center and the Center for Inclusive Trade and Development; Inu Manak, a CFR fellow for trade policy; and Francisco Sanchez, partner with Holland & Knight, and a former undersecretary of commerce for international trade with the Obama administration. Jennifer, I know you need to head out a little bit early, so let’s get started. So we have now reached the end of the ninety-day pause on the liberation day tariffs enacted to—which were enacted to allow for trade negotiations between the U.S. and trading partners. However, the deadline for the tariffs and the trade negotiations has moved to first of August, with only two framework trade deals put in place—one with the U.K., and one with Vietnam. So my first questions to the panelists are, what was actually achieved during the first ninety days? What should we expect on the U.S. front over the next few weeks or even next months? And does uncertainty around trade negotiations bring more concessions to the U.S.? Francisco, would you like to start? SANCHEZ: Yes. Thank you, Dima. It’s a pleasure to be with you, and with Inu and Jennifer. Thanks to the Council for inviting me. I think it would be good to start with what is the underlying goals—what are the underlying goals that President Trump and his administration are trying to achieve, and then see what he has achieved. Clearly, one objective is just as a negotiation strategy. You might describe President Trump’s strategy is one of sticks and no carrots. And so he’s trying to make it necessary, if you will, to have people come to the—countries come to the table. That’s one. Two, President Trump, long before he was ever in politics, was feeling that American business is unfairly treated by other countries in the world. So he’s seeking to find more fairness for American business. Third, he’s trying to bring back manufacturing to the United States. And, fourth, to raise revenue. And finally, fifth, he’s looking for cooperation on non-tariff barriers that a lot of countries engage in. I would say at this point the success, if you measure it against those five goals, is rather limited. As you correctly point out, there two agreements—framework agreements. The details haven’t been worked out. When he made that announcement back in April, some members of his administration said there’d be ninety deals in ninety days. I think it’s going to be difficult. One, USTR is a rather small agency. They don’t have the resources they need to do a lot of deals. That’s number one. And, number two, negotiating trade deals is hard. India, for example, started negotiations with us in February, and here it is now nearly the middle of July and we still don’t have a deal. So I think it’s going to be slow moving. There’ll probably be some deals done before the August deadline, but I don’t think there’ll be a lot. CVETKOVA: Thank you, Francisco. And I’m going to turn over to Inu. I remember reading one of the articles she published. And she was talking about the average time it takes to sign a trade deal, which has nothing to do with the ninety days we have now. So, Inu, what is your take on what we should expect by the first of August and beyond that? MANAK: Yeah. I mean negotiating trade agreements is very hard. It takes, usually, 917 days to negotiate a trade deal. So that is definitely not that ninety-day deadline that President Trump was hoping to conclude a ton of deals in. So I’m not surprised that we only have basically 1.5 deals that we know of, right? So the U.K. deal, the text is out. We’ve seen what’s in it. The Vietnam deal, we’ve heard a little bit about what might be in it, but we have seen no text. And it seems like there’s still a bit of ironing of the details going on. So what have we seen so far? If we look at the deals and the structure of what the administration seems to be negotiating, it looks to be about five different aspects that they’re trying to nail down. First is really trying to get tariff reductions where they can, because tariffs are a big part of President Trump’s trade strategy. Second is to have some sort of cooperation on non-tariff barriers. They haven’t really defined what they are, but said if you look at the national trade estimate report it’s all in there. So that’s where countries can actually take a look. The third item that they’re looking at is digital trade provisions, trying to figure out how to get countries on board to U.S. approaches to digital trade. The fourth item has been some sort of cooperation on economic security. This is kind of vaguely defined, and it varies by country, but it means a little bit more investment screening, perhaps a little bit more monitoring of supply chains to ensure there’s not transshipment of goods from China, and other aspects of economic security measures that they may want to undertake. And then the last part are commercial considerations sort of broadly defined. This includes things like encouraging investment in the United States to help boost the manufacturing base and also purchase agreements as well, like ethanol, which the U.K. actually signed up for. So if you kind of look at the U.K. agreement in particular—so that’s the one that we have. It’s five pages. So it’s a quick read. But it reads more like a term sheet than a trade agreement. So folks who are used to reading trade agreements, it’s a little puzzling to see it because you’re, like, what are you trying to do here? It’s a deal that resolves some trade irritants. It’s mostly a framework for future negotiations on a range of issues, but doesn’t really resolve all those issues right now. And, importantly, what it does is sets the stage for negotiation on future Section 232 national security tariffs that may come in place, but doesn’t guarantee that the U.K. is going to get any carveouts there. So it basically leaves open a negotiation that’s going to happen over and over again over the coming years. And it’s not clear where the landing point is going to be. And Vietnam has a very similar structure in its agreement as well. So I imagine we’re going to see more of these come through slowly in the next couple of weeks, but what we’re seeing is really rough contour of what every single country is going to be negotiating. CVETKOVA: So this is going to actually continue a lot longer, you know, after this sort of framework—basic framework is signed. Negotiations will continue for a lot longer. Jennifer, over to you. The same questions with a little bit—from a different angle. We just talked about—before we started the meeting—about the average tariff rates for the U.S., and all the reasoning behind the tariffs. Could you please comment on that? HILLMAN: Yeah. I mean, clearly, you know, one of the things that has been, if you will, achieved, is a significant raising of taxes on Americans. You know, again, so if these tariffs that the president has now announced, you know, through July 7—including, again, the Vietnam trade framework agreement, the U.K. agreement, and, you know, the announcements of these new rates on fourteen more countries. If those go into effect, we will end up with an average U.S. tariff in the United States—average tariff, again, so plenty of them that would be higher than that—of 17.6 percent, which is the highest rate that we’ve seen on our tariffs since 1934. And, again, we have to remember, at their core, you know, that tariffs are taxes, you know, on American consumers. Because it is the importer in the United States that’s paying that tax. And therefore, we have to remember that these are very regressive taxes, meaning low- and moderate-income people are the ones that bear by far the largest brunt of these taxes. Because it is low- and moderate-income people that are spending 30 or 40 percent of their income buying the kinds of goods—you know, shoes, and clothing, and all kinds of the goods that are the subjects of these tariffs. Again, they’re spending 40 percent of their income. High-income people are spending less than 10 percent of their income, you know, purchasing these goods that are subject to the tariffs. So whatever else they’re doing, they are raising taxes very substantially on Americans. Which, again, feeds into one of the goals here being, you know, to raise revenue. Again, but it is raising revenue heavily on the backs of those Americans that are being taxed. CVETKOVA: Great. Thank you for that. And it’s a great segue to my next question, which is, you know, the U.S. administration announced the trade deals as the best deals for American people and American workers. And this is back to you, Francsico. How is the trade agenda impacting American households, building on what Jennifer said, and businesses? And what could be some important positive and negative outcomes of the trade negotiations? SANCHEZ: Well, it will undoubtably impact a number of sectors more significantly than others—electronics, automotive, retail, construction materials, certain foods. We’re likely to see that go up. As Jennifer said, this is essentially a tax. And so you’re likely to see costs go up. On jobs, it’s interesting. If you take steel, for example, he’s—President Trump has increased tariffs on steel and aluminum. The steel industry has approximately 90,000 millworkers. And if you take their industry as a whole, they probably employ upwards to about 280,000 people in total. That includes office workers, salespeople, everybody. If you put tariffs on steel, then you’re likely to see more production, so their employee numbers may go up because there’ll be more demand for American steel. But compare that to automotive. The automotive industry in the United States has about four million employees. If the cost of inputs for the automotive industry goes up, there’s a chance that that sector will see a drop in sales and you could actually see a drop in the number of employees in the automotive sector that would dwarf any increase in the steel industry. Worse than that, I’d say, would be construction. We have about eleven million people that work in construction. It’s a sector that’s very dependent on steel. So you’ll see potentially a major reduction in the number of employees in the construction space that also would dwarf any increase. So while there’d be a benefit in the steel industry, you could see other sectors, like construction and the automobile manufacturing, actually go down. CVETKOVA: Inu and Jennifer, would you like to add anything to what Francsico was saying. MANAK: Go ahead, Jennifer. HILLMAN: I mean—I mean, to some degree I think you’re already seeing a little bit of this. If you look, for example, at the price of steel in the United States compared to the price of steel elsewhere in the world, you know, again—I, you know, recently looked at the numbers; the price for a hot rolled sheet of steel in the United States is over $900 a ton, whereas the world average price is $400 a ton. The average price in Europe, around $600 a ton. So if every manufacturer in the United States that needs to purchase steel to use it to make a product out of it is spending almost twice as much as any of their competitors are for that basic component, you know, the concern is what it does to long-term competitiveness. You know, and then you turn to things like construction. You know, again, in addition to the tariffs on steel and aluminum, and now these across-the-board tariffs—these so-called reciprocal tariffs on these, you know, fourteen-plus countries that are above the 10 percent that’s been added onto everybody in the world—and, again, you start to see it. And then you look at what is likely coming, which is a number of these section—so-called Section 232 national security tariffs. So, again, we have to remember that there are investigations pending right now today on semiconductors, on pharmaceuticals, on copper, on timber and lumber—again, heavily involved in construction—on critical minerals and derivative products, on medium and heavy-duty trucks and parts, and on commercial aircraft and jet engines. So if, again, we were to result in even more tariffs on all of those sectors on top of all of these others, you can see what a significant impact it could have in a number of these key sectors of our economy. CVETKOVA: So can I follow up on that actually? We were talking about we were talking about legal challenges, and there is a lot of talk about legal challenges to these tariffs. So, as a legal expert, can I ask you, do you think that legal challenges can derail the U.S. trade agenda? HILLMAN: I certainly think that there’s a very good chance that the legal challenges will at least temporarily derail the tariffs that have been imposed under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, or IEEPA. Again, and that is all of these 10 percent across the board tariffs, and all of the tariffs that we’ve just described that are the ones under the U.K. agreement, the Vietnam agreement, and, again, the new tariffs that were announced last night against these fourteen countries—all of the so-called reciprocal tariffs. Those were all imposed under IEEPA, as were the tariffs on Canada and Mexico. Remember, we’ve got a 25 percent tariff on Canada and Mexico, and, again, 20 percent more on China as a result of IEEPA tariffs, subject to this so-called fentanyl crisis—this emergency on fentanyl. So all of those tariffs, which pretty much means everything except the existing tariffs on steel and aluminum and cars, are subject to this IEEPA challenge. And it is a big challenge. Two courts have already ruled that the president’s tariffs under IEEPA are illegal, unlawful. Why? Because, again, the Congress is given the power by the Constitution to impose tariffs. Again, Article One Section Eight of the Constitution is very clear. It is the Congress and the Congress alone that has the power to impose tariffs. So the president can only impose tariffs if the Congress has handed over authority from the Congress to the president. And so the question before the courts is, did the Congress hand over this authority in this IEEPA statute? And the courts have found, and many are arguing, that the answer to that question is no. Again, partly because, again, it has to—the words that the president is relying on is that IEEPA gives the president the power to regulate importation and exportation. And so then the question becomes, does “regulate importation or exportation” mean tariff? And the argument is, no, it does not, because in every other law in which the Congress delegates that power to impose a tariff, it uses the word “duty” or “tariff.” And it puts in procedural requirements. It puts in timing requirements. It puts in notice and comment requirements. It puts in limits on the amount of the tariffs that can be imposed. None of those exist in IEEPA. So, again, there’s a big challenge as to whether or not IEEPA provides the president with tariff authority at all. And, again, at least one court has already ruled to say, no, it doesn’t. And then the second aspect of IEEPA is you can only impose these tariffs if you have declared there to be a national emergency, which is—which, again, is defined in the law as an unusual and extraordinary event having its genesis outside of the United States. So the second big argument to all of these reciprocal tariffs is how can you say that a trade deficit is an unusual and extraordinary event when the United States has been running a trade deficit every single year for fifty consecutive years? The deficit is not particularly high compared to our GDP, you know, in this year. So how is this an unusual and extraordinary threat if it’s something that’s been happening for fifty years? And similarly, the argument on the fentanyl tariffs is, you know, what is putting a tariff on, you know, teddy bears, or T-shirts, or anything, else have to do with fentanyl? There has to be a connection between the emergency that’s been declared and the action that’s been taken, tariffs. So across all of those fronts, there are these very serious challenges pending to the tariffs. These challenges are currently pending before two different appeals courts, again, because the courts have already ruled, no, you can’t use IEEPA for tariffs. The appeals are pending. I’m assuming that by early fall we will have decisions by these appeals courts as to whether or not they believe that IEEPA provides tariffs authority or not. And then presumably, from there going, you know, again to the Supreme Court, I would assume sometime, you know, again, in the winter we will have some court—sort of a ruling from the United States Supreme Court. CVETKOVA: Thank you. I want to go back to the trade deals. I want to make sure that we talk about the U.S.—potential U.S.-China trade deal. And Inu, I want to turn to you and ask you, if there is a U.S.-China trade deal—I mean, I do remember the first Trump administration the Phase One and Phase Two agreements, and what happened with that. If reached, this U.S.-China trade deal, what shape or form do you think it is going to take? Or are we just going to see a prolonged trade conflict instead of the trade deal? MANAK: Thank you, Dima. You know, I think it’s going to be very difficult to do something very comprehensive with China, because comprehensive deals take time. And it takes a principled approach with really clear targets that you’re trying to achieve. And the administration’s trade policy has basically been erratic. It’s been erratic because they’ve been trying to get quick deals, but a quick deal with China won’t bring about the systemic change that’s needed to address some of the concerns that were brought up in the original Section 301 report on unfair trade practices with China under the first Trump administration. Now, if we look at what happened during the first Trump administration, we had the Phase One deal on January 15, 2020, signed. It included various commitments, mainly focused on purchase commitments, including agricultural products, industrial products, natural resources, and services. Now, if we look at how that did, Chad Bown from the Peterson Institute found that China actually only purchased 58 percent of the total U.S. goods and services exports over 2020-2021 that it had committed to buy. And it bought none of the additional $200 billion of U.S. exports committed under the deal. So the Phase One deal not only did not live up to the purchase commitments, but it also failed to systemically change some of the concerns he had about China in terms of unfair trade practices, including whether or not it was violating IP rights and it was using forced technology transfer. All these things were left unaddressed. Now, if we are to deal with that, one of the things we need to be doing is to work with our trading partners, who we’re now raising tariffs against, to find a way to actually work together to have common rules around how we deal with China. And at the moment, what we’re doing is actually pushing a lot of our trading partners closer to China by closing off our own market and threatening all these tariffs over and over again. So I think that at the end of the day if we actually are to have some significant reforms and a comprehensive deal, we kind of need to step back and take some time, right? We can’t have this general framework that we keep modifying every other month where it comes to no real strong commitments at the end of the day, and we have no dispute settlement mechanism that we can use to enforce it. So China Phase One deal has no dispute settlement mechanism. And if you look at the text of the U.K. deal, I don’t see one there either. And, in fact, it says it’s a nonbinding deal. So how can we actually achieve concrete results if the agreements are nonbinding? So I think there is a big question here about what we can actually achieve and huge limitations in just the structure of the negotiations themselves. CVETKOVA: That’s great. And I and it brings me to the next question, actually. It leads on to, are we actually seeing the U.S. on the way to withdrawing from leadership from the global trading system? And if the three of you can think of five years from now what the trade landscape is going to look like, how do you visit it? Francisco, would you like to start? SANCHEZ: Well, the short answer is, yes. We are retreating from being the global leader in promoting free trade, in being against protectionism, if you will. Going from being against protectionism to being the leader in protectionism, in many ways. You know, hard to predict what’ll happen in five years, but there’s no question that what’s happening here will largely—(off mic, technical difficulties)—the other countries, when they negotiate with some of their trading partners that aren’t the United States. So I do see a retreat from globalism, a retreat from free trade. And time will only tell how far we go. I’m very concerned that probably our biggest economic adversary—not probably—our biggest economic adversary is China. And yet, of the fourteen countries that were mentioned yesterday, many of them are in Asia where we should be strengthening those ties and not creating tensions. I’m talking about Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia. So it creates tension where we should be creating cooperation to go after the most challenging economic problems we have, which I believe is China. Inu mentioned intellectual property, theft, forced transfer of technology. Those are the issues we need to be focusing on. And they’re hard. So I don’t believe on critical issues we’ll see those be resolved soon. To the extent we have a deal with China before the end of the year, I believe there’ll be, perhaps at best, some short-term advantages, but not long-term. HILLMAN: For what it’s worth, I’d only add that, you know what you—a couple of things. One is, you know, there is a huge risk to the whole world if we, in essence, fragment the global trading system into two big blocs—a kind of, you know, pro-U.S. bloc and a pro-China bloc. The WTO and the IMF and the World Bank, you know, recently published a study that said if we just do that—just that fragmentation alone, with no other changes happening in the rest of the economy, we’re looking at a 7 percent reduction in global GDP, and even more of a reduction for many of the developing and least-developed countries. So, again, a huge risk of fragmentation. And the other thing to watch China doing in response—you know, again, you have to be really clear about what did China do the last time the United States engaged in this trade war, is to some degree the same thing they’re doing right now. Which is, to the extent that they raised tariffs on U.S. products they lowered them on goods from everywhere else. China is immediately sort of doubling down and going to all of its Asian neighbors and saying, you know, we are a reliable trading partner. The United States is not. You should do more of your trade, you know, in and around and with the United—with China. China is trying to become, itself, much more, again, the hub of all of this trade, you know, within Asia. So I do think we need to be really worried about it. You know, and as Francisco said, I mean, many, countries share our concerns over what China is doing on intellectual property theft, on over producing, overcapacity, flooding the rest of the world with all of this excess capacity in goods that’s driving down prices for everybody in the world. A lot of countries share that. But they cannot get on board with the United States in fighting it if the United States is going to turn around and put tariffs on them. And, again, the tariffs come on and off and on and off. So, you know, that I think is the real risk, is that we’re going to fragment the world and we’re going to put countries in this very tough position about whether or not they want to side with China or whether they want to side with the United States. They don’t want to side. They want to trade with everybody. And yet, you know, we may be pushing them to have to make a decision. SANCHEZ: And, Dima, if I may add one more thing, is that the tough approach, or the no carrots a lot of sticks approach doesn’t work well when your counterparty has its own set of tools to fight back with. One that the Chinese have used, I think very effectively, is holding back export licenses on rare earths, something that’s very important to a lot of American industries. So it isn’t as though China doesn’t hold any cards. They hold quite a few. I would also point out that China is prepared to have its population be ready for economic difficulties, rather than to just simply cave in to something that President Trump may want. So I think no matter how you look at it, the negotiation with China on issues of real importance to us are going to be very, very difficult and probably a long time in coming. CVETKOVA: Thank you, Francisco. And, Inu, before I turn to you with the same question, I just want to mention for the audience that we’ll be opening the Q&A session in just a moment. So if you do have a question, please raise your hand now to join the queue. So, Inu, over to you. MANAK: All right. Thank you. You know, just to add one big picture point to that. When I’m looking at sort of U.S. engagement and global trade leadership, I would say we haven’t been a leader in the global trading system for eight years. And we never kind of stepped back into the role of leadership once we stepped out of it in the first Trump administration. You know, when Trump first entered office, he effectively ignored the global trade rules. And then Biden came in. And he largely followed suit. Most of what Trump did in his first term was maintained in the Biden years. There was a window of opportunity early on in the Biden administration to reverse course, but the prevailing view in the administration was in support of greater protectionism. And they kept betting on protectionism and to keep it in place to avoid losing support among working-class voters, who, in the end, voted them out anyways. So I think that strategy did not work. And it showed to be something that actually was not something that folks were responding to. And here, Trump’s come back and said, well, you kept these in place, obviously they’re popular, and so let’s just ratchet them up. And so what we’re seeing today is taking that tariff policy to even greater extremes. And we don’t really have any counterweight to that anymore. And so I think there’s a bit of a scramble internally within the United States to see, like, where Democrats stand on these issues today. And there’s a lot of soul searching going on to figure out where they do stand on it. So I think we’re going to see a lot of that play out in the next couple of years, as we have members of Congress respond to the pain that their constituents are surely going to feel as some of these tariffs actually take effect. And I think what we’re starting to see, in fact, in looking forward in the next couple of years, is the fact if maintain these tariffs and, as Jennifer said, you have additional tariffs coming on 232—if you pile on tariff after tariff, the U.S. is going to become an increasingly closed market. And when 50 percent of what we import are intermediate products, that means those who are going to be hit most are going to be small and mid-sized businesses. And they are going to suffer. We’re going to have less consumption and less growth. We already have low growth projections. And we’re going to see that other countries are going to look elsewhere for arrangements in which to trade. The CPTPP, which the U.S. withdrew from, is becoming one of those frameworks, and others may try to bolster the WTO and other arrangements in order to find ways to trade on a rules-based way. The EU has said that they want to do that. So we’ll see more diversification from our trading partners, less coming here. And it’s going to make the United States a less safe bet for investments over time if we have a really unstable trade landscape. So a lot of uncertainty. It’s hard to see where it’s going to land. CVETKOVA: Thank you, Inu. And, actually, mentioning the WTO, Jennifer, I’ll turn over to you, with your experience and your background. What are the urgent—what are the urgent things we need to—the WTO needs to change in a certain way? What are the urgent changes that have to be made, when it comes to the WTO? HILLMAN: Well, obviously, you know, the big concern at the WTO is here you have, you know, arguably, the two largest trading partners in the world—China and the United States—basically engaging in, effectively, a trade war outside the bounds of the WTO, which, again, doesn’t suggest the—you know, that the WTO is playing this highly relevant role. You know, again, because every single one of these tariffs—whether they’re under 232 or under IEEPA—are a violation of the United States’ commitments under the WTO. I mean, we promised when we joined the WTO, again, and when we helped create the WTO, that we would not charge tariffs in excess of the rates that we bound our tariffs at, and that we would not charge tariffs that differentiated between this country versus that country. We would not discriminate with respect to our tariffs. And, obviously, all of these tariffs are discriminatory. So, again, most of the other countries look at the United States and basically say, it’s the United States that is the major problem at the WTO, not China. That it’s the United States that’s not playing by the rules, not China. And, again, that is not in our long-term interest. So what does the WTO need to do? I mean, to me, I think, A, the WTO has got to do everything that it can to try to urge all of the other countries in the world to maintain their tariff commitments. And if they must retaliate against the United States, or must do things on the tariff front, to try to stay within those rules of what are their bound rates, what are their MFN commitments, to try to adhere as closely as they can to the rules. The second one is obviously the dispute settlement system. The United States has, again, destroyed the dispute settlement system by blocking any appointments to the appellate body. A number of countries have come up with this alternative, what is referred to as a Multi-Party Interim Arrangement on Arbitration for Appeals, MPIA. Again, every country has the option of joining that MPIA. And, again, using the rules of the WTO to try to stay as close as possible to a rules-based system. And, obviously, the WTO has got to do a lot of changing on its own. It’s clear that over the life of the WTO it has become way too hard for the WTO to update its rule book. Again, it lives under a rule called consensus where, again, nothing gets agreed upon unless everybody agrees. And it’s become just way too easy for countries to just raise a flag and block a consensus. So the WTO has got to engage in a lot of thinking about how to make decisions better, how to end up with agreements that at least the majority of or a clear plurilateral group of countries can support, so the rest of the world can move ahead even if there are some countries that are not ready to move ahead. They’ve got to update the way in which they go about rule making. And, to me, they’ve got to keep doing and do more of what they do do well, which is to provide, you know, again, a forum for everybody to talk. And, more importantly, transparency. Again, you know, you can go—you can find out everybody’s tariff rates, sanitary measures, phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade. They’re all notified to the WTO. So they are—the WTO is a tremendous resource for countries. And, again, they need to do all of that, and to continue to do it well, while they are figuring out how to fix their dispute settlement system and how to fix the sort of negotiating arm of the WTO. CVETKOVA: Thank you, Jennifer. And I want to turn to Francisco with a different question. You’ve helped companies navigate this very difficult trade landscape. We laid it out there. We talked in the past a lot, and you continue to talk about supply chain resilience. So how are companies actually navigating this space? SANCHEZ: A lot of them very difficultly. When you establish supply chains it takes time. And particularly when you’re doing supply chain resiliency, you’re trying to find multiple supply chains to make sure you have backups. But this is—this isn’t something that you turn on a dime. And so it’s very disruptive. It’s something that’s on every company’s mind that relies particularly on international supply chains, and very challenging. I might add, this is not exactly on point to your question, but going back to one of the original purposes of this trade strategy is to attract manufacturing back to the United States. Japan currently is our number-one—or, number one or number two depending on what source you look at, source of foreign direct investment. And 41 percent of that foreign direct investment goes into manufacturing. This is kind of hard to understand. If that’s our goal, it seems like one of our important trading partners that we’ve just slapped—or threatened to slap 25 percent tariffs if we don’t reach a deal by August one, how that is a great motivator to somebody who seems to be doing what they want. And to answer—going back to your question, that foreign direct investment will be harder for companies to make the decision to invest here if their supply chains are harder to put together, whether it’s an American company or whether it’s this foreign direct investment that’s coming from Japan and other countries. So I’d say it’s been a big challenge. And because of the economic uncertainty that we’re seeing in the execution of this trade policy, I believe that that difficulty is going to remain for some time. CVETKOVA: Thank you, Francisco. And at this stage, I can see that we have a question from the audience. I want to turn to this question. Let me just remind the audience that this meeting is on the record. Alexis, can we have the question please? OPERATOR: (Gives queuing instructions.) We will take the first question from Mara Lee. Q: Hi. This is Mara Lee. I’m a reporter with International Trade Today. And if you will forgive me, I’m going to squeeze in two questions. One question is about this question of transshipment in the Vietnam framework. Robert Lighthizer has talked about transshipment in a way that doesn’t mean transshipment, that just means a certain amount of Chinese content in a good. And so I wanted to get y’all’s thoughts about how—what the U.S. might get other countries to agree to in terms of will it be more like a rule of origin, that if you have, you know, 60 percent of the value is Chinese it doesn’t count? My other question is sort of this game of chicken, in the sense that Japan and South Korea really don’t seem to be able to accept a world that the 25 percent auto tariffs don’t go away. And we don’t seem to be willing to have them go away. So will Trump have to back down in the end because the market will discipline him? Someone said there isn’t any more guardrails, but he did back down in April because of a huge stock market drop. You know, the market’s not going to care about 40 percent on Cambodia or 25 percent on Kazakhstan, but they may care about 25 percent on some of our very largest sources of imports. HILLMAN: So I can—I can start first with the transshipment question. Just to say, unfortunately, we don’t know. I mean, what the agreement—what little we know says that the tariffs on everything from Vietnam is 20 percent, unless it has been transshipped in which case it’s 40 percent. Now, again, normally transshipment is considered something illegal if you basically are, in essence, slapping a label on something that says “made in Vietnam” when it was, in fact, made in somewhere else. I mean, that is normally what we think of as transshipment. And so obviously if that’s what you’re doing, you know, that is illegal, and, you know, it should carry a higher tariff. But if what they really mean is that you’re simply using components from everyone else, that is not what we normally understand transshipment to be. I mean, normally we live with—again, the 20 percent tariff on Vietnam ought to be on anything that is considered made in Vietnam. How do we know if it’s made in Vietnam? It’s whether it meets the existing today rules of origin that apply to Vietnam, and many other countries. And that rule is generally wherever it—wherever that article is last substantially transformed into a new and different article of commerce, or underwent, you know, a tariff shift where it becomes a new item under the tariff schedule. If that work occurred in Vietnam, that good should be considered made in Vietnam for purposes of customs, and should be subject to the 20 percent tariffs. So we simply don’t know whether they’re going to come up with some kind of a different definition of what is meant by transshipment in this. And the only other thing I will say is those kind of negotiations, over rules of origin and changing rules of origin to require more work to be done in Vietnam in order to qualify for that 20 percent tariff, are not easy to negotiate. Because the way in which every different product is made is different, and therefore you have to really struggle to figure out how are you defining the rules of origin within any given product? I mean, you saw this really clearly in the auto rules of origin with respect to the USMCA, the U.S., Mexico, Canada agreement, where that was a large negotiation to try to just figure out how to change those rules of origin, adding in requirements on where the steel was melted and poured, and a lot of other things. So the answer is—on the transshipment—I think we really don’t know what they mean or what they’re getting at by that, and won’t until we see actual terms of an agreement. SANCHEZ: Well, I’ll take a shot at the second question. I’m not terribly good at making predictions. In fact, I’ve made predictions that have been wrong in the past. But I’m going to take a shot at it. I don’t believe that the 25 percent tariff that President Trump announced will stick with Japan and South Korea, in part precisely because of what your question implies, is the increased cost to the American consumer would be substantial. I think it is—as we mentioned at the beginning of this program, one of President Trump’s goals is to get leverage in negotiations. And I do believe that that number is more about leverage than locking into that tariff rate. CVETKOVA: Thank you very much. Do we have—do we have other questions at the moment? OPERATOR: No other questions at the moment. CVETKOVA: No further questions at the moment. So I have another question for the panelists. And I sort of want to know, when you think about the U.S. trade policy is there an aspect of it, at least one thing you can mention, that has been either overlooked or, on the flip side, anything that has been overemphasized? And why? Inu, would you like to chime in? MANAK: Yeah. No, thank you. I mean, I think the thing that’s often being overlooked is the fact that we need imports in order to do the things that we do here. You know, if you have to have a vibrant manufacturing base, we need to import components. And so I think what the administration is focusing on is really just not going to be achieved. You know, they say they want to increase manufacturing and exports. Well, you can’t do that without imports, right? And so I think this is one side of it that we need to talk a little bit more about to understand the tradeoffs of imposing tariffs in all these various sectors, right? Because, as Francisco mentioned early on, you know, if you impose a tariff, say, maybe you’re going to show some sort of increase in manufacturing output, maybe in some protected sectors, right? But you’re going to lose it elsewhere. And so we have to have a broader conversation about where is it that we think we should be investing all this trade protection? And is it worth it in the end for the job losses and the reduced output we’re going to create in other sectors? And so I think that’s a broader conversation that’s not being had right now. We’re focusing so much on manufacturing, when manufacturing has been doing quite well. We have tremendous amounts of manufacturing productivity output. We have a good amount of employment in our manufacturing industry. We could do more. We could have more automation, which we’re actually quite behind in compared to other countries. If you look at the number of robots that China has in its manufacturing facilities compared to us, we are really, really low in that number. So we need to do more here in investments. But it’s not tariffs that’s going to get us to that point. And so we have to have that question of, like, what is the goal here, and how do we actually go ahead and achieve it? And how do we do it where we’re basically strangling ourselves by limiting our options for what we can actually purchase abroad? SANCHEZ: Dima, I think another premise of President Trump’s trade policy that needs to be scrutinized is the definition of America being unfairly treated. Trade deficits have been used to define whether there’s unfair treatment between the United States and a particular country. But, as Inu pointed out, one of the reasons that we import things is to make things, right? Our supply chains are international, and we need—we need products from across the board. Another reason that we import things is because we’re the wealthiest country in the world. And so defining an unfair trade relationship just based on the deficit, it just—it doesn’t make sense. There may be unfairness going on, but to measure it based on our trade deficit seems, to me, like a poor measure. HILLMAN: I’d only add two additional ones, in terms of what are we missing? I mean, obviously, to me—and it was sort of implicit in some of what Inu was saying—is, you know, manufacturing of goods is about eight or 9 percent of the GDP of the United States, if you don’t count agriculture. So what are we missing? We’re missing the ninety percent rest of the U.S. economy, which is largely in services. And this is where the United States, again, has a trade advantage. This is where we really do have, you know, the ability to outcompete a lot of other countries. And all of this time that we’re spending talking about tariffs and talking about manufacturing, as important as that is, means that we are not focused on what do we need to do to remain highly competitive on the services side. And the second piece of it, to me, that we’re really not appreciating, I don’t think, is the cost of chaos and uncertainty. And why has that chaos and uncertainty come into our trading system? And here’s where, again, I do think it goes back to some of the basis for the legal questions, because it used to be that Congress set trade policy. And so for an act to go through Congress, whether it was a free trade agreement, or whether it was trade promotion authority, or whether it was the tariff schedules that were included within the Uruguay Round agreements—once the Congress voted on that trade policy, it stayed that way for a fairly significant amount of time. And, yes, you could add tariffs as a result of anti-dumping, countervailing duty, safeguards, you know, other actions. But fundamentally, there wasn’t these huge pendulum swings. And now that we’re deciding to make all tariff action and trade policy by the executive branch, again, you’re seeing this big swing away from where—you know, again, away from a stable trade policy, in a way that I think is really hard not just for our trading partners, but for everybody in the supply chain to deal with the fact that they literally do not know what the tariffs are. They don’t know when they’re going to be applied. And that they could change at a moment’s notice for any reason. And that they’re not—they’re not related to something that you can at least predict what’s going to happen. There’s no predicting here. And I think we’re underestimating what a drag on the U.S. economy that level of chaos is creating. CVETKOVA: I would like to end this conversation on a positive note. (Laughs.) So I’m going to ask you a final question before I conclude the meeting. Is there any positive outcome that you believe could come out of this trade policy and trade negotiations? HILLMAN: I’m going to go first, only because, I’m sorry, that I do have to leave a little bit early. So I apologize to my fellow panelists that this is—you know, I’ve got to walk out the door. For me, the positive that could really come from this is if we’re starting to have really, you know, again, helpful conversations with our trading partners about many of the things that that Inu mentioned at the beginning are part of, potentially, the U.K. negotiation. You know, again, things like cooperation on non-tariff barriers, digital trade provisions, cooperation on economic security and, again, maybe cooperation on what to do broadly about China. If these negotiations do that, and we don’t take this only attitude of we have to win and you have to lose in order for it to be a good trade negotiation, if we can focus on those other things, then, to me, particularly on the digital trade agenda where there are no international rules and we desperately need them—you know, if out of all of this chaos could come a better sense of where we’re headed on digital trade, to me, that would be—that would be a big win, and is not out of the realm of the possible. So I hope that’s leaving you, at least from my end, on a bit of a happy note. CVETKOVA: Thank you very much, Jennifer. Thank you. (Laughs.) Inu, digital trade. I hear—(laughs)—would you like to chime in? (Laughs.) MANAK: Yeah, absolutely. Now, I think there is a real opportunity, actually. So there is all this leverage that’s been created from the tariffs that have been put in place. Countries want to negotiate with the United States. So we should use that enthusiasm to actually get something done, right? You know, forget the deadline. And deadlines don’t really matter. I think that’s been pretty clear this year, that the deadlines can move. And that’s OK. Trade negotiations take a long time. And we should take the time to do it right. And on digital trade is something where the United States has long been a champion of creating global rules, but we dropped the ball on that a couple of years ago. And now is our chance to make sure that we can have global rules on digital trade that reflect U.S. interest. There have been negotiations ongoing at the World Trade Organization for several years. Last year, they got very far along, to the point where they actually have what’s called a stabilized text. That just means there’s lots of stuff that’s pretty much agreed to, and there’s a few things that aren’t agreed. I think for the United States, it would make a lot of sense to go into those negotiations and say, hey, look, maybe we need to change some things here, and expand a little bit what we’re doing, and include some provisions in there that are a little bit more stringent for China, in particular, to address some of the concerns over data localization, for instance, that have been a major sticking point in negotiation. So I think there’s a real opportunity for that. But also just generally, on the WTO reform front, we could do a lot. We can address the problem of developing country status in the WTO, which is self-declared. You are a developing country if you say you are. That’s something that’s been a major sticking point for a very long time. We could address the unfairness of subsidies and overcapacity by having a broader conversation about that. And if we don’t do it there, we can do it within a smaller grouping of countries that are actually also concerned about it. We had discussions under Robert Lighthizer between the EU, Japan, and the United States on overcapacity and subsidies reform. We should rebuild those discussions again and try to find a way to have some common ground there, because if we work together and we leverage our allies to make sure we can actually get these changes, I think there’s a real chance that we can have some positive structural reform at the end of all of this. CVETKOVA: Thank you. And Francisco. SANCHEZ: I’m probably in very strong agreement with the comments that Inu made and Jennifer made. I do believe there’s an opportunity here to focus on non-tariff barriers, which are often more problematic than the tariffs themselves. Anytime you start a conversation there’s hope. There’s hope that you can have something good happen. And I think in the non-tariff barrier space we could see some movement. And that would be a very positive thing. Jennifer mentioned more cooperation among the countries that are concerned about China as an economic threat, particularly in some of the unfair practices that they engage in. And, again, just starting the conversation with countries, even though these conversations have been testy in many cases, could lead to cooperation to something that really is going to be critical for our future. And then finally, not so much on the trade front but geopolitically, it’s possible that we begin to get closer to India, for example, which is going to be an important country for the United States to build a relationship with, not just economically, but geopolitically. And the same in the Asia region. Although we’ve had very difficult, it seems, conversations with Japan and Korea and others, geopolitically it’s in our interest to be closer and to work together. And I’m hoping, from this chaotic beginning, we can see an improved relationship that that that goes to our geopolitical interests as well. CVETKOVA: Thank you very much. With that, I would like to conclude the meeting by thanking the speakers for a very lively and engaging discussion, the audience for joining us, and the Council on Foreign Relations for organizing this event. Thank you. SANCHEZ: Thank you. MANAK: Thank you. (END)

    Virtual Event with Jennifer Hillman, Inu Manak, Francisco Sanchez and Dima Cvetkova July 8, 2025

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    Featuring Inu Manak via BBC News June 27, 2025

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    Tariffs on Trial: What’s Next for President Trump’s Trade Policy

    Play
    CFR experts discuss the recent court rulings on the legality of the Trump administration’s sweeping tariffs, and analyze the implications for U.S. trade policy, the impact on global markets, and the legal challenges ahead. This meeting is presented by RealEcon: Reimagining American Economic Leadership, a CFR initiative of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies. To register for this virtual meeting, please click the Register button. Please make note of the log-in information listed in this invitation so you may access the meeting.

    Virtual Event with Edward Alden, Jennifer Hillman, Inu Manak, Michael Froman and Matthew P. Goodman June 2, 2025

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